In another instance of Moscow barring goods from neighboring countries, Russia’s agricultural authority banned a host of Kazakh produce on October 17.  While the Kremlin cited health concerns, onlookers point to Kazakhstan’s October 16 announcement that it would not join the intergovernmental BRICS organization, an international association where Russia holds sway.  The decision came amid a growing spat that pits Kazakhstan’s, Uzbekistan’s, and Russia’s officials against one another with regional economic implications. 

While Kazakhstan’s diplomatic-economic dust up with Russia has been marked by subdued rhetoric, the same cannot quite be said of Uzbekistan.  On October 17, the first deputy speaker of Uzbekistan’s parliament, Akmal Saidov, clarified that Uzbekistan would not be joining the Russian-backed Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).   Explaining the decision, Saidov stated, “For example, our Kazakh colleagues, their country has received very few benefits from joining the EAEU.”

In what might have been a response, Sergei Mironov, a member of the Russian Duma and head of the “Just Russia – For Truth” party, posted to X calling for the reimposition of a visa regime for the more than one million Uzbek migrants in Russia.  Protesting the fact that an Uzbek consul general had recommended Uzbek migrants not join the Russian military, he wrote, “Why didn't they call on them not to receive maternity capital?”  Minorov continued, “Not to use other benefits? This is possible! But defending the country that feeds you is not allowed.... Such ‘citizens’ are not needed.”  Minorov is a vocal supporter of Russia’s war in Ukraine.  His party is the third largest in the Duma.

Minorov’s comments however produced pushback from Uzbekistan.  The deputy speaker of Uzbekistan’s parliament and the head of the governing party’s coalition partner, Alisher Qodirov, responded to Minorov on his X account, “People as blessed as Uzbeks earn their rights by hard work, not by killing people. Russia should be protected by [Minorov’s] sons, sons-in-law, grandchildren.”  Another Uzbek member of parliament wrote on his Telegram page that, “We will never accept the involvement of our compatriots in another country's wars.  Furthermore, our compatriots contribute significantly to Russia's economy through their labor....  Such aggressive rhetoric will only damage bilateral relations." 

Quodirov has earned a reputation as Uzbekistan’s leading public nationalist and has spoken against the use of the Russian language in Uzbek schools and Russo-Soviet legacy cultural organizations in Uzbekistan.  Given his high-level political ties in Tashkent, Quodirov’s statements likely have at least some degree of tacit support from the government. 

In Kazakhstan, a country that shares a long border with Russia and has a sizable ethnic-Russian minority, officials have not spoken as overtly and strongly against Russia.  But Kazakhstan’s differences with their northern neighbor have already produced economic ramifications.  Prior to the decision barring some Kazakh produce, in late September, Russia began to block shipments of grain from Kazakhstan, citing alleged health concerns.  A month prior, Kazakhstan had banned the importation of Russian grain in order to protect its own domestic markets.  

Both Kazakhstan and Russia are net-exporters of gain, but Kazakhstan has historically relied on Russia as a passthrough for shipments to grain markets in Europe.  In the last year, Russia has also banned some produce from Armenia, likely in response to Armenia’s increasingly Western-oriented foreign policy. 

Since 2022, the question of how Russia’s aggression in Ukraine would affect its status in Central Asia has had mixed answers.  In some ways, Central Asia has drawn closer to Russia, utilizing Russian gas resources to meet dire energy needs.  Yet, since the beginning of the war, Central Asians have shown a willingness to stand up to Russia, with no Central Asian state supporting the invasion of Ukraine.  Recent developments are showing that the trend is likely here to stay.