Russia has long sought influence through the sizable role it plays in global energy markets.  This is no less true in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, where Russia has used discounted gas to secure political leverage, likely disrupting energy shipments through Russian-managed infrastructure to punish Central Asia for not backing the invasion of Ukraine, and has taken control of some energy infrastructure through debt-equity deals.  But recent months have seen Russia proactively work to shore up influence in Central Asia, a region suffering from power shortages and aging Soviet-era energy infrastructure.  One of Russia’s newest tools in this regard is through state-owned Rosatom, which has traditionally focused on nuclear power and which supports the government’s economic and policy objectives of increasing nuclear goods and services. 

In recent years, Russia has actively sought to increase its role in Central Asian energy, lobbying Central Asian governments to build new nuclear power plants throughout the region using Rosatom. Russia has also upped its involvement in the region’s uranium sector.  Russia controls nearly half the world’s uranium enrichment capacity, including uranium produced in Central Asia, and owns approximately 26% of uranium deposits in Kazakhstan.  In late 2022, Rosatom bought a 49% stake in the Budenovskoye uranium field in Kazakhstan, expected to become the world’s single largest source of uranium, with all output of the joint venture reserved for the Russian nuclear industry in 2024-2026.

In response, Central Asians have been wary of entangling their energy grids too heavily with Russian nuclear infrastructure.  In Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Rosatom’s new nuclear projects have been kept relatively small, likely below Russia’s hopes.  Kazakhstan, which plans on building a major new nuclear facility, has hinted that they will use South Korean reactors, with an official stating that they will seek two reactors totaling a capacity of up to 2,800 megawatts (Rosatom produces reactors that generate 1000 or 1200 megawatts, while only South Korea produces a 1400 megawatt reactor). 

There are a number of possible reasons for Central Asian suspicions about Russian nuclear technology.  In fact, Russian nuclear energy is something of a taboo in Central Asia, where there are recent memories of hazardous Soviet-era nuclear testing in the region which resulted in wide-ranging public health issues.  But an aversion to Russian nuclear power has not stopped Russia from seeking to increase its role in Central Asia’s energy markets.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, European countries, once making up the largest share of Russian energy sales previously, have gone to great lengths to decrease their use of Russian hydrocarbons.  For Russia, the need to expand customers elsewhere has therefore been apparent.  At the same time, major power shortages in recent years underscored for Central Asians the need to grow capacity to keep up with higher demand and to refurbish aging Soviet-era energy grids. 

The result has been an expanded role for Russia in Central Asian energy since 2022 beyond just Rosatom.  Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan have all increased their imports of Russian hydrocarbons, and Russian President Vladamir Putin has worked to establish a gas-union with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan to sell and transport Russia’s gas across the region.  Russia has begun directly selling electricity to Kyrgyzstan and increased the amount sold to Kazakhstan and is now helping construct coal-fired power plants in both countries.

But Russia is now also deploying Rosatom in Central Asia in fast-growing, new energy sectors, including renewable power.  The state-owned enterprise announced in March the construction of a 110 mega-watt wind-power plant in Kyrgyzstan, the firm’s first such enterprise abroad.  Rosatom has expanded its wind-energy capacity in recent years, founding a wind-energy division in 2017 and building wind-energy facilities throughout the Russian Federation.  Further statements released by Dmitry Konstantinov, Director General of Rosatom’s Kyrgyzstan office, in September pointed to a series of new Rosatom renewable energy investments in Kyrgyzstan with a combined worth of $1.5 billion.  Aside from the Issyk-Kul wind farm, these investments include a series of 400 mega-watt hydroelectric plants.

In addition to developments in Kyrgyzstan, Rosatom presented Tajik officials with an investment plan this August to build one gigawatt  of renewable energy facilities that could power hundreds of thousands of homes.  Tajik Deputy Energy Minister Manuchehr Safarzoda express interest in the proposal saying, “I’m confident that cooperation with Rosatom is an important step in strengthening the country’s sovereign energy balance.” Following their August meeting, Tajikistan and Russia agreed to sign a memorandum of understand on implementing this project. 

For Moscow, energy revenues have been a major source of state income.  In 2024, Russia estimated it would take in a total of $118 billion from oil and gas revenues alone.  In 2022, Rosatom’s foreign order portfolio reached an estimated $200 billion.  The energy titan has also proven itself resilient to Western sanctions and efforts to isolate Russia, since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.  The company still operates around the globe and continues to expand, including to Western-friendly countries  India, Türkiye, and Egypt.  Each purchased Rosatom reactors in recent years and continues cooperating with the Russian firm through projects that often entail the recipient country taking on significant debts, affording Moscow even more leverage over them.

There may be risks for Central Asia in allowing such a large role for Russia in the region’s energy.  Russia has a track-record of seizing jointly produced energy infrastructure as part of debt-equity restructuring and using energy supplies for political purposes. Western countries have become increasingly hostile to Rosatom, with the U.S. government sanctioning, and members of the U.S. Congress moving to further sanction, the energy giant.  U.S. officials point to ample evidence that Rosatom “uses energy exports, including in the nuclear sector, to exert political and economic pressure on its customers globally,” and provides Russia with military goods and billions in funds to the Kremlin. In 2022, official statistics reported Rosatom provided nearly $3.4 billion in taxes, roughly one percent of Russia’s entire federal budget for that year.  In 2023, the company reported $14 billion in international revenue.

All this would seem to raise the specter of a threat to energy sovereignty for Central Asian states and the potential for Central Asia to be impacted by potential further Rosatom sanctions.  For the region, however, it would seem whatever risks of allowing Russia such a large role in their energy market are counterbalanced by the dire need to avoid a future crisis on par with the surprise power shortages and gas-rationing of the winter of 2022.

In Central Asia, Rosatom has faced something of a stumbling block with governments resisting large-scale Russian nuclear projects.  Russia, however, has not seemed deterred by this, having already increased its role in Central Asian gas and electricity markets.  Rosatom is now maneuvering to take on a major role in renewable energy projects and will be involved in two, admittedly small, nuclear power plants.  Despite two years of Western efforts to isolate Russia and target its place in global energy markets, Moscow continues to expand its energy influence in Central Asia.  Governments in the region are no doubt aware of the potential risks this may entail, but face a difficult challenge imposed by rapidly growing energy needs, upgrading the region’s tired energy infrastructure, and the imperative of a climate-friendly energy transition.