In the winter of 2022 - 2023, much of Central Asia experienced dire cold and power outages, epitomizing the long-running power shortages that have plagued Central Asia.  Central Asian governments are now challenging old taboos and investing in nuclear power to address this problem.  In June, Kazakhstan announced there would be a fall referendum on the construction of a new nuclear power plant (NPP) along Kazakhstan’s Lake Balkhash.  Throughout Central Asia, governments are looking to nuclear energy to solve a variety of major crises in the region.  Yet, while nuclear power promises to address many serious problems for Central Asia, it also is a source of concern to many in a region that has a dark nuclear history.

Nuclear energy, and especially when these countries were still Soviet socialist republics, is a sensitive issue in much of Central Asia.  During the Soviet period, Moscow's use of Central Asia for above-ground nuclear weapons testing, dangerous uranium mining, and ore processing caused significant damage to the regional environment and public health.  Between 1949 and 1991, Kazakhstan experienced the fallout from 456 nuclear weapons tests around the Semipalatinsk test site, producing high rates of cancer and birth defects in 488 out of every 1,000 babies by the late 1990s in the test zone region.  The result in Kazakhstan has produced a strong anti-nuclear movement across the country, as well as stringent anti-nuclear and denuclearization policies that resulted in the surrender of the independent nation’s  nuclear weapons, tons of nuclear material, and nuclear technology.

Neighboring Kyrgyzstan has a history of landslides shifting uranium tailings and contaminating waterways.  Recent discussions about re-opening Soviet-era mines there have already seen local protests in opposition to uranium mining, which was banned in 2019 but relegalized in 2024.  Currently, there are no active NPPs in Central Asia.

High-profile incidents, such as Russia’s risky occupation and behavior around Ukraine’s Zaporizhya NPP and even events as far back as the Chernobyl disaster, when combined with Central Asia’s own history, likely contribute to negative public perceptions about nuclear energy.  Perhaps even more so when Rosatom, Russia's state nuclear energy corporation, is involved.

It might, therefore, come as a surprise to some that governments throughout Central Asia are considering building out nuclear energy sectors.  Nuclear power offers serious incentives for Central Asia.  Central Asian nations all struggle with energy deficits and have been hit by surprise blackouts and winter gas shortages in recent years caused by irregular weather, growing demand, and aging grid infrastructure.  The region is broadly dependent on coal, particularly for winter heat, with a 2023 report finding 60% of Central Asia’s yearly energy is generated by burning coal.  Kazakhstan sources 80% of electricity from burning coal. Coal accounts for 17% of energy in Kyrgyzstan, a percentage that likely grows during the cold winter months when usage increases.  Central Asia is also a global outlier with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan looking to expand coal usage while most countries are phasing out coal.

Inefficient and causing dangerous public health effects, burning coal has additional negative impacts on the environment.  In Central Asia, burning coal further affects air quality and water systems through pollution and hastening snow melt.

As a non-carbon source of energy, NPPs would allow governments to increase energy production without worsening climate change – a pressing concern for one of the fastest warming regions of the world.  Central Asia has some of the world's largest reserves of yellow cake uranium, mostly located within Kazakhstan, and so a shift to nuclear power would make practical sense.  

New energy plants are seen as crucial, not only for quality of life but also for economic growth.   Referencing this, Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev said in May that “nearly all the leading countries of the world ensure their energy security and sustainable development with the help of nuclear energy.”  Uzbekistan is looking to increase and stabilize its energy supply writ large, with additional plans to import Russian oil and gas, because any nuclear power plant is years away from construction and completion.   

Alongside Kazakhstan’s Lake Balkhash initiative, Uzbekistan signed an agreement in May 2024 with Russia to construct a small NPP, with Moscow promising $400 million in funds.  Uzbek officials are also considering building a much larger NPP.  Kyrgyz Deputy Energy Minister Sabyrbek Sultanbekov announced in February that Kyrgyzstan was considering building a 300-megawatt Small Modular Reactor (SMR) large enough to power hundreds of thousands of homes, since Kyrgyzstan signed a memorandum of understanding with Rosatom on small NPP construction in 2022.  In 2024, Kyrgyzstan also re-legalized the controversial practice of uranium mining, which it had banned in 2019.

Building nuclear energy systems with Rosatom might give Moscow another instrument to exercise influence in an area it considers as its zone of interest, especially if Russia becomes a source of fuel for Central Asian countries.  Russia has routinely used energy resources and infrastructure to leverage its interests in neighboring countries, for instance interfering with the Caspian Consortium Pipeline over the course of 2022, in a likely effort to punish Kazakhstan for not supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine. .

Partnering with a Russian state-owned firm also brings the potential of secondary sanctions.  The U.S. Congress is currently debating a bill to sanction Rosatom, arguing that the energy corporation provides money for Russia’s war effort.  Anti-Russian sanctions have already delayed the construction of a Russian-built NNP in Türkiye.  

There is evidence that Central Asians are cognizant of the political and economic hazards involved in NPPs as they pertain to Russia; and, despite the dire need to expand stable energy flows, they are limiting their involvement with Rosatom.  So far, Central Asians are keeping Rosatom projects small while also considering seeking new partners.

Kazakhstan has not yet announced what foreign companies or governments it will partner with for the Balkhash NPP.  Astana has expressed interest in U.S. small modular reactor (SMR) technology.  There is also evidence that Astana will source its reactors not from Russia, but from South Korea.  In July, a Kazakhstan official stated that the proposed plant would use two power units with a capacity of up to 2,800 megawatts.  Rosatom only produces reactors that generate 1000 or 1200 megawatts.  The only 1400-megawatt reactors in production worldwide are the Korean-designed APR1400, indicating Kazakhstan might not use Rosatom reactors.  If this turns out to be the case, it would be a significant step in building out Central Asia’s future energy system without technology from Russia.  However, even if Kazakhstan purchases South Korean reactors, Russia will likely remain a major source of enriched uranium fuel.  

Additionally, while Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are willing to work with Russia on NPP construction, the small size of the projects is noteworthy.  Uzbek authorities mighty have agreed to build a NNP with Rosatom, but the 330-megawatt facility currently slated for construction is a far cry from the $11 billion 2.5-gigawatt plant Russia had first proposed in 2017 and 2018.  While Tashkent remains interested in building a larger NPP, an Uzbek official stated in 2023 that Uzbekistan was still considering its options for a partner, and that seems not yet to have changed.

Across Central Asia, there is a dire need for expanded, reliable, and more environmentally friendly energy infrastructure.  Nuclear power presents a set of serious incentives, helping to shift away from energy sources that have dire environmental impacts, including climate change, water shortages, and air pollution.  Yet, Central Asian governments have a delicate path to tread.  They need to balance inherent risks that nuclear energy could bring, including not just construction, management, and supply problems related to their northern neighbor, but also societal concerns over nuclear safety.  And there is the desperate need to stabilize the region’s energy grid to avoid further shutdowns, as well as to supply the needs for rapidly growing populations.  Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan already appear to be exploring alternatives to engagement with Russia in this field, keeping investments with Moscow small so far.  But with clear needs, Central Asians seem more ready to commit to nuclear energy. For now, where Russia will ultimately fit into this picture is uncertain.