On March 3, Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov visited Baku, Azerbaijan, and held discussions with Azerbaijan’s Prime Minister Ali Asadov and President Ilham Aliyev.   While the official statement on the meeting released by Aliyev’s press service noted discussions on the ongoing construction of the Middle Corridor, the visit coincided with other regional stresses that might have provided additional incentive for the meeting. 

Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have been two of the principal actors in the build-out of the Middle Corridor, with the ports at Aktau and Baku being critical points along the route.  During the meeting, Aliyev underscored optimism about the Middle Corridor and his hopes for continued cooperation.  Bektenov echoed these sentiments and stated that 2024 had seen a 60% increase in cargo transit across the corridor. 

Energy was an additional topic of discussion, with the Azerbaijani statement on the meeting referencing Kazakhstan’s desire to increase output through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline as well as to build a green energy corridor.  Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan are seeking to build a green energy transit route by which Central Asian wind and solar energy will be able to reach European markets using undersea cables. 

Bektenov’s visit also produced several bilateral agreements, including for the design and construction of an underwater fiber-optic communication line between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.

While a meeting between Kazakhstani and Azerbaijani officials does not necessarily require any speculative explanation, developments in recent weeks have likely underscored the importance of trans-Caspian relations for policy makers in Baku and Astana.

In February, Ukrainian drones successfully struck the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), dropping output by 30-40% as reported by Russian officials.  While Kazakhstan has released positive statements on its oil exports, with 80% of Kazakh crude oil exports entering global markets by way of the CPC, it is difficult to imagine how Kazakhstan’s exports were unaffected by the attack.  Regardless of the impact, however, the incident emphasized the risks of continued Kazakhstani reliance on Russian oil-pipelines. 

For Kazakhstan, the only notable alternative export pipeline that does not run through Russia is the BTC.  Kazakhstan’s policy makers have long sought to increase the amount of oil shipped through the pipeline, and the latest attack on the CPC likely only brought greater attention to the issue.

From an even broader viewpoint, the rapid developments of Western politics related to the Russo-Ukrainian war also raise the importance of trans-Caspian relations.  The United States has historically stated its support for territorial integrity and sovereignty throughout the post-Soviet space.  With Washington now seemingly de-prioritizing that commitment with its emerging policy on Ukraine, the security landscape of the region seems primed for renewed challenges emanating from Moscow. 

With this in view, strengthening regional ties throughout the South Caucasus and Central Asia will be all the more crucial.