As global political tensions intensify, the previously blurred lines of state alignments are becoming clearer. In the South Caucasus and the broader Middle East, this is observed in the emergence of new alliances and the strengthening of existing ones, with far-reaching implications for regional stability and international relations. While Georgia remains in geopolitical limbo due to its deteriorating relations with Western powers, the cases of Armenia and Azerbaijan warrant closer scrutiny. Despite recent progress in their bilateral peace talks – mediated in part by the United States and the European Union – the two countries continue to find themselves at the heart of geopolitical rivalries.

This is not a new development in the external orientations of Baku and Yerevan. Those familiar with South Caucasian politics know that Armenia has been a close ally of Russia within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), while also maintaining strong ties with Iran since the early post-Soviet years. In contrast, Azerbaijan – whose territories were partially occupied by Armenia from 1992 until their liberation in 2020 and 2023 – has pursued a balanced foreign policy, avoiding military blocs and refraining from aligning with one power at the expense of its relations with others. At the same time, Azerbaijan has successfully built comprehensive partnerships with Türkiye, Israel, and Pakistan, among others, leveraging its strategic position as a secular Muslim-majority state bordering Russia and Iran.

These days significant developments are unfolding in Azerbaijan’s relations with Israel and the United States, fostering a trilateral alliance based on shared interests in security, energy, and technology. Meanwhile, Armenia, seeking to counterbalance this partnership, is aligning itself more closely with Iran, formalizing a comprehensive strategic agreement that bolsters Tehran’s presence in the region. These shifts not only highlight the divergent foreign policy trajectories of Azerbaijan and Armenia but also underscore the broader geopolitical contest between Western-aligned powers and Iran’s sphere of influence, with profound implications for the United States, Israel, and their regional partners.

Emerging Chances for Azerbaijan-Israel-U.S.A. Partnership Format

Azerbaijan’s burgeoning relationship with Israel has been a cornerstone of its foreign policy for over three decades, built on mutual interests and a shared understanding of regional threats. Israel views Azerbaijan as a vital ally in the Caucasus – a secular Muslim-majority state offering a counterweight to Iran’s theocratic ambitions. As Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi noted in 2021, “Azerbaijan is an ally, a friend, and the largest supplier of energy resources to Israel.” 

The partnership spans defense, trade, technology, and energy, growing increasingly robust in recent years. In March 2025, Israel’s Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) underscored this alliance, stating, “Azerbaijan is an important strategic ally of Israel in the Caucasus region, with relations encompassing cooperation in security, trade, technology, and energy sectors.” This followed a Knesset motion to upgrade the strategic alliance, signaling Israel’s intent to integrate Azerbaijan into a broader trilateral framework with the United States.

A key driver of this partnership is energy cooperation. Azerbaijan supplies over 60% of Israel’s gasoline, a role that proved critical during the Second Intifada (2000–2004) and the 2023–2024 war against Hamas and Hezbollah, when Azerbaijan increased oil exports to Israel by 55%. The two countries are determined to upgrade the energy partnership. This month, Azerbaijan and Israel will formalize a previously announced agreement, securing Azerbaijan a 10% share in Israel’s Tamar Gas Field, while also unveiling two larger energy initiatives in Israeli waters close to the Lebanese border.

This energy deal not only bolsters economic ties but also underscores a political shift, positioning Azerbaijan as a candidate for inclusion in the Abraham Accords framework – the first Trump-era initiative aimed at normalizing relations between Israel and Muslim-majority states. With the Trump administration re-taking office on January 20, 2025, prioritizing Israel’s security and the expansion of the Accords, Azerbaijan’s 30-year partnership with Israel – longer and more comprehensive than any other Muslim nation’s – makes it a prime candidate. Leaders of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), meeting with Azerbaijan’s President in December 2024, acknowledged that past U.S. administrations underappreciated Baku’s contributions to regional stability and support for Israel.

The trilateral aspirations of Israel, Azerbaijan, and the United States are not merely economic but reflect a strategic alignment against common adversaries, particularly Iran. Azerbaijan’s secular governance and tolerance of its Jewish minority – described by Knesset member Simon Moshiashvili as “an exemplary, active, thriving, and especially united community” – stand in stark contrast to Iran’s repressive policies and hostility toward Israel. Baku’s openness to cooperation with the West, including its thriving partnership with Israel, has made it a target of Tehran’s ire. Iranian state media consistently urge countermeasures against Baku’s ambitions and counter the emerging Israeli-Azerbaijani-American alliance.

Iranian leaders do not hesitate from questioning Azerbaijan’s independence and its ethnic identity, claiming that Azerbaijan was a historical part of Iran and should return to the Iranian control. For instance, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Ali Fadavi, who, in a tweet in 2022, reiterated these historical claims against Azerbaijan saying that this country “was separated from Iran due to the incompetence of the Qajar kings”. Attempting to take the advantage of the Shiite believers in Azerbaijan, he openly called for a government change in Baku. “The people of Azerbaijan are Shiite believers who did not lose their original Shiite beliefs under the 70 years of communist pressure. As a rule, there should be a government that pays special attention to this Shiite majority of Azerbaijan”, he added.

Azerbaijan’s relations with Türkiye, Israel, and the Western actors have provided a critical counterbalance against such threats. Likewise, for Israel and the United States, Azerbaijan offers an important buffer against Iran’s northwestern border enhanced by the presence of around 20 million ethnic Azerbaijanis, Iran’s largest minority, comprising more than 20% of its population. 

Azerbaijan’s strategic value extends beyond countering Iran. It is vital to Europe’s energy security, supplying natural gas to 10 European countries as an alternative to Russian supplies, and serves as a hub for the Middle Corridor – a trade route connecting Europe to Central Asia via the South Caucasus, bypassing Russia.  In July 2022, Baku signed a new memorandum of understanding with the European Union (EU) to increase Azerbaijani gas exports to the EU from 12 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year to 20 bcm by 2027. Officials in Brussels certainly see the importance of diversifying energy imports away from Russia—European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called Azerbaijan a “reliable” partner in the bloc’s renewed emphasis on energy security.

In November 2024, Israel’s ambassador to Baku noted, “Israeli companies are now recognizing the strategic importance of Azerbaijan, not only as a partner but also as a crossroads between East and West – the Middle Corridor – serving as a gateway to Central Asia.” This aligns with U.S. interests in developing alternative trade routes to reduce Russian influence, especially amid Russia’s war on Ukraine, which has disrupted Eurasian stability since 2022. Azerbaijan’s support for Ukraine – including $40 million in humanitarian aid and free fuel – further contrasts with Armenia and Iran’s assistance to Russia, reinforcing Baku’s alignment with Western goals.

U.S.-Azerbaijan ties, historically focused on energy projects like the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor (with a 2022 EU deal to boost gas exports to 20 billion cubic meters by 2027), are ripe for expansion. Azerbaijan’s contributions to the U.S. war on terrorism further solidify this partnership. Following the 9/11 attacks, Azerbaijan was among the first nations to offer unconditional support, providing airspace and intelligence cooperation for U.S. operations in Afghanistan. From 2002 to 2018, Azerbaijani troops served alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan, with over 1,500 soldiers deployed in peacekeeping and combat roles, earning praise from NATO and U.S. commanders for their professionalism. Baku also facilitated the Northern Distribution Network, a critical supply route for U.S. and NATO forces, highlighting its logistical importance. 

The relations between Azerbaijan and the United States survived a crisis period during the presidency of Joe Biden who was more oriented towards Armenia. In 2024, the Biden administration re-activated Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act of 1992, which was adopted on October 24, 1992, and bars the United States from offering assistance to Azerbaijan unless Baku takes “demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh”. The United States had granted annual waivers for this amendment since 2002. That year, Baku permitted Washington to use its territory to supply U.S. troops in Afghanistan. The reactivation of this amendment after the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan took place against the backdrop of deepening relations between the United States and Armenia, exposing biased and transactional posture of the Biden administration.

President Ilham Aliyev, addressing the 12^th Global Baku Forum on March 13, expressed his confidence that relations between Washington and Baku will return to the previous positive path. Highlighting that the Azerbaijani government is very hopeful about the Trump administration, he said that the reason is simple:

“…[T]he policy of Mr. Antony Blinken towards Azerbaijan actually ruined U.S.-Azerbaijan relations, which we had been building for 30 years. We have always been a very reliable partner and friend to the United States. When they needed us, we were with them. When they needed us in Iraq, we were in Iraq with our troops. When they needed us in Afghanistan, we were one of the first non-NATO countries to join operations in Afghanistan in 2001. And we were among the last to leave. After we left, they imposed sanctions on us. I remember it was a big frustration in Azerbaijan. I told some of their representatives, “How can we trust you?” So, when you need us, you waive the sanctions. When you don't need us any longer, you re-impose the sanctions. How can we build long-term relations with you?”

These developments provide a strong foundation for a trilateral format of strategic cooperation amongst Azerbaijan, Israel, and the United States. Azerbaijan’s consistent support for U.S. counterterrorism efforts, combined with its strategic partnership with Israel, positions it as a pivotal player in such a strategic format. The Trump administration’s focus on strengthening alliances with reliable partners offers a timely opportunity to elevate this cooperation into a formalized trilateral framework, enhancing security and stability in the South Caucasus and beyond.

Armenia’s Efforts to Balance the Azerbaijan-Israel Partnership by Allying with Iran

While Azerbaijan strengthens its Western-aligned partnerships, Armenia is deepening its ties with Iran, a move that threatens to destabilize the region and undermine U.S. and Israeli interests. In early 2025, Iran’s ambassador to Armenia, Mehdi Sobhani – a senior figure in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – announced that Tehran and Yerevan are finalizing an expanded comprehensive strategic agreement. This long-term pact, set to be signed by both country’ leaders in the upcoming months, builds on an alliance that has intensified since Azerbaijan’s 2020 victory in the Second Karabakh War, which extended its border with Iran by around 100 km. Sobhani, who previously coordinated Iranian activities in Syria, emphasized that the agreement would shield Iran-Armenia ties from external pressures – a pointed reference to Western influence.

Iran sees Armenia as a proxy and buffer against Azerbaijan and Türkiye, actively opposing normalization efforts like the Zangezur corridor, which would connect Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave and Türkiye. Economically, Iran leverages Armenia to circumvent Western sanctions, with a major Iranian trade center in Yerevan providing access to the Russia-led EAEU for IRGC-dominated industries. Reports of Iran selling $500 million worth of weapons, including drones, to Armenia – echoing its support for Russia in Ukraine – further destabilize the South Caucasus. Armenia’s history of facilitating sanctions evasion, such as acquiring Western-made airplanes and weapons for Iran, deepens its entanglement with Tehran’s illicit networks.

This alignment is partly a response to Azerbaijan’s partnership with Israel, which solidified during the Second Karabakh War when Israeli-supplied weapons – comprising 60–69% of Azerbaijan’s military imports in the years preceding the 2020 war – enabled Baku’s victory. Iran, which tacitly supported Armenia’s occupation of Azerbaijani territory for 30 years, views this shift as a threat. The IRGC’s 2021–2022 border drills and propaganda campaigns labeling Azerbaijan’s leadership as “Zionist puppets” underscore Tehran’s hostility, intensifying as Azerbaijan opened its embassy in Israel in 2022 and deepened ties with Jerusalem despite regional pressure.

Armenia’s stance also complicates ongoing peace talks with Azerbaijan, contradicting what State Secretary Marco Rubio described as “President Trump’s vision for a more peaceful world” in his March 14, 2025 statement on the completion of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty text. Although both sides have agreed on the treaty’s wording, significant revanchist forces in Armenia continue to advocate for military buildup and the recapture of territories Azerbaijan liberated in 2020 and 2023. Military supplies from France and India, along with Armenia’s alliance with Iran, embolden these forces, posing a serious threat to regional peace efforts.

The Azerbaijan-Israel-USA Format Is a Necessity for Regional Stability

The contrasting trajectories of Azerbaijan and Armenia have profound implications for U.S. policy, particularly against the backdrop of fundamental changes the Trump administration push forward in the global politics. Azerbaijan’s alignment with Israel and the United States offers a strategic opportunity to counter Tehran’s influence, bolster regional stability, and expand the Abraham Accords. For the Trump administration, Azerbaijan’s mediation between Israel and Türkiye offers additional leverage to stabilize the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Asia. Its unique position as a secular Muslim state fostering Israel-Muslim ties aligns with the vision of the Abraham Accords. Conversely, Armenia’s alliance with Iran and Russia threatens U.S. interests, from sanctions enforcement to peace in the South Caucasus. A trilateral Azerbaijan-Israel-U.S.A. format, rooted in decades of trust and shared goals, is not just an opportunity – it’s a necessity for a stable, Western-aligned region. This necessity is underscored by Azerbaijan’s proven reliability as a U.S. partner in counterterrorism and energy security, as well as its potential to bridge Israel and other Muslim-majority states, enhancing the Trump administration’s vision for a peaceful world.

Vasif Huseynov is the Head of Deprartment at the Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center). All views, positions, and conclusions in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author.