In July, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan hosted to a U.S. delegation aiming to enhance U.S. business and infrastructure involvement in Central Asia.  At the center of the trip were representatives from the Partnership on Global Infrastructure and Investment (initially abbreviated PGII, and later just PGI), a joint project of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, France, and Japan, seeking to mobilize and invest $600 billion worldwide by 2027.  Now, with a recent announcement, PGI has promised nearly a $600 million investment in Kazakhstan’s rail development, with claims there is more to come.  

PGI is positioned to become a significant mobilizing intuition for Central Asian–Western relations.  It would also seem to inevitably invite contrast with another prominent source of foreign investment in the region, Beijing’s Belt in Road Initiative (BRI). BRI has dominated much of the discussion about Central Asian infrastructure, since its initial announcement at a 2013 summit in Astana, Kazakhstan.  But now, over a decade later, the G7 countries are seemingly seeking to put forward a similar program.

Recent announcements and trips demonstrate that PGI likely has a long-term interest in Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan.  In June 2024, the White House reported that PGI, via the U.S. EXIM Bank, was set to loan $594 million to Kazakhstan’s national rail company, Kazakhstan Temir Zholy.  The investment aims to support the export of locomotives and shunter kits manufactured by the U.S. company Wabtec.  Rail is of particular importance for building out infrastructure along the developing Middle Corridor, reducing transit time and shipping costs, something U.S. Trade Representative Kathleen Tai laid out as a U.S. goal during her visit to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.  The investment follows a notable increase in U.S. interest in economic opportunities in Central Asia, evidenced by the 2023 establishment of the U.S.- Central Asia Critical Minerals Dialogue, as well as the U.S. backed B5+1 Business Forum.

Perhaps more significant, however, were the statements delivered by the State Department’s PGI Special Coordinator Helaina Matza, during the U.S. delegation’s July visit to Central Asia.  There, Matza affirmed that G7 countries were willing to invest up to $200 billion in Central Asia by 2027, with a high percentage going to Kazakhstan.  

PGI works in partnership with the European Union’s Global Gateway initiative that has likewise focused on the development of Central Asian connectivity.  The Global Gateway, which also is regularly compared to BRI, is a European initiative to build out transit and energy infrastructure in lower- and middle-income countries.  In January 2024, the Global Gateway announced a €10 billion investment in Central Asian connectivity. 

It appears Central Asia is reaping the benefits of private-sector and resource-driven investment as well as the increasingly competitive geopolitical environment.  PGI’s mission statement lists a series of priorities, such as clean energy transitions, economic development, gender equality, and human rights.  But the organization is also often read by outside analysts as a Western push-back against Chinese economic influence, and against the BRI in particular.  Both programs seek to build out global connectivity while cementing the role of their respective governmental and private-sector sponsors. 

On the geopolitical front, two aspects of PGI hint that it is a political instrument as well as an economic one. The first is the fact that PGI is an initiative of the G7.  The G7 took on a distinctly political tone when it expelled Russia (turning it into the G7 from the G8) in response to Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014.  The G7 is now comprised only of Western-affiliated democracies and, apart from Japan, represents NATO members.  The G7 has been at the forefront of leveraging Russia’s foreign assets to provide help to Ukraine, has issued warnings against what it views as inappropriate Chinese trade practices, and critiqued what it describes as China’s “transfer of dual-use materials, including weapons components and equipment, that are inputs for Russia’s defense sector.”

Second, PGI contrasts with the BRI, given that the latter reflects China’s state-oriented development model while the former has a much greater emphasis on private enterprise and public-private partnerships.  The result is that PGI avoids what has become a serious issue for BRI, what critics term “debt-trap diplomacy,” with Beijing holding leverage over recipient countries due to untenable amounts of public debt.  In Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan re-paying high debts to China has come at additional fiscal cost, requiring controversial new taxes.  Tajikistan, unable to pay back Chinese-held debt, famously ceded 1000 sq km of territory to China in 2021.  BRI, by becoming such a clear tool for Chinese influence, has also become more politicized as time has gone by. Italy exited the initiative in 2023, and membership is becoming more controversial for Western-aligned countries.  PGI, on the other hand, is a relatively new initiative and does not appear to have such negative connotations. 

The quality and local impact of Chinese investment writ-large in Central Asia is coming under increased scrutiny.  The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, while an important priority for Bishkek and Tashkent, has faced serious delays.  In Tajikistan, Chinese involvement in the mining sector is reportedly having near catastrophic public health and environmental repercussions.  While Tajik authorities have largely ignored these problems, it stands to reason that Central Asian states are cognizant of these problems, especially risks to sovereignty.  PGI on the other hand has put a strong emphasis on high-quality responsible projects, as well as transparent procurement and competitive bidding processes which are useful for contrasting with BRI’s restrictive, closed-door practices and for attracting private-sector investment.  There is, therefore, ample reason to believe that PGI will be an appealing alternative for Central Asian states.

American and European governments and institutions are ramping up their interest and investment in Central Asia.  Many initiatives speak to this, but PGI stands out for its ability to multi-laterally organize mass investments.  Notably, because PGI reflects a more open and private-sector oriented approach, it draws contrast with BRI and speaks to the fact that the United States and its allies could be able to provide Central Asian states with higher quality deliverables with fewer strings attached. PGI, therefore, has the potential to be one of the central mechanisms for the ongoing construction of both the Middle Corridor and U.S.-Central Asia ties.