Billed as a reformer in the international press, Iran’s newly elected and sworn in president Masoud Pezeshkian has publicly claimed the beginning of a newly pragmatic Iranian approach to international relations.  In an open letter published on July 12, Pezeshkian lays out this approach, saying that his aim to, “…Pursue an opportunity-driven policy by creating balance in relations with all countries.”  The countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus were not explicitly mentioned in this letter, nevertheless, Iran plays a meaningful role in the foreign policy of many countries of the Caspian region.  The day of Pezeshkian’s July 30 inauguration saw meetings between the new president and leaders from Armenia, Goergia and all five Central Asian republics.  While it is likely fair to say out that Iran’s biggest impact will be felt in the Middle East, Pezeshkian’s inauguration does have potentially meaningful implications for the Caspian region.  

Azerbaijan 

Azerbaijan has a traditionally contentious relationship with Iran.  Concerns around radical Shi’ism, Iran’s treatment of its own ethnic Azeri population, Iranian-Armenian ties, as well as Azerbaijan’s close security ties to Israel have often injected tension into the relationship between Baku and Tehran.  The sheer size difference, with Iran having close to nine times Azerbaijan’s population and roughly 15 million ethnic Azeris, has presented Baku was an inherent imbalance. Recent years had seen a particular low point in relations, with a shooting at the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran spiraling into Baku cutting off diplomatic relations.  

But the period leading up to Iran’s recent elections has seen detente between the neighbors.  Azerbaijan recently re-opened its embassy in Tehran and the death of President Ibrahim Raisi, which triggered July’s elections, occurred on the return from a state visit to Baku. Analysts and officials have given the former president’s diplomatic efforts credit for mending the relationship. 

Pezeshkian’s biography includes some indications that he will likely continue this pattern.  He is of ethnic-Azeri and -Kurdish background and speaks fluent Azerbaijani, something already noted as a positive by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.  While he is a religious Shia, his background may ease high-level relations between Baku and Azerbaijan.  The pragmatic course that Pezeshkian ostensibly prioritizes likewise bodes well for any continued Azerbaijani-Iranian reproachment.  

Russia, China and trans-Caspian Commerce 

Despite some rhetorical outreach to the West, Pezeshkian has also evidenced strong interest in bolstering Russia-Iran relations.  This was indicated by his open letter’s statement that, “Russia is a valued strategic ally and neighbor to Iran and my administration will remain committed to expanding and enhancing our cooperation.”  In that same paragraph he goes on to write, “I will continue to prioritize bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Russia, particularly within frameworks such as Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Eurasia Economic Union (EEU).”  

Russia-Iran trade and transport have serious implications for the Caspian region.  The Caspian itself has been a central thoroughfare for military shipments, an area in which Russian and Iranian sanctions-evasion tactics have been frequently used to provide the suicide drones and ballistic misses Russia deploys against Ukrainian troops and population centers.  With Iran having signed a free-trade deal with the Russian-backed EEU, regional commerce seems set to expand in the coming years. While Iran has not been able to use Azerbaijan’s port at Baku to ship to Russia, it uses the Caspian for unregulated and potentially sanctions-dodging shipments, albeit with limited potential due to the limited number of cargo ships in the Caspian.  In addition, Iran ships to Russia via Azerbaijani rail lines.  Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan have recently announced plans to build out a new eastern north-south transit corridor linking all four countries, though this will take years to build, once funding has been secured. 

Pezeshkian additionally appears interested in expanding relations with China.  Given U.S. sanctions, Iran-China trade is already crucial for Tehran, with China buying close to 90% of Iranian oil exports.  At the moment, Iranian oil and goods largely reach China by way of a “dark fleet” that labels Iranian products as goods from other countries in order to avoid detection.  This fleet usually navigates the Indian and Pacific oceans, but if Iran expands trade further it could bring more attention to Central Asian infrastructure linking China to Iran.  Already, Iran, China, and Turkmenistan have announced a new rail line linking Iran to Turkmenistan. Pezeshkian’s presidency could see increased attention on and utilization of Central Asian trade infrastructure.  Increased shipping, in turn, could attract the attention of U.S. policymakers, who at times have instituted secondary sanctions against Central Asian firms that sell dual use products to Russia. 

Tajikistan 

Tajikistan has frequently looked towards Iran for military equipment in recent years.  Shut out of some explicitly Turkic initiatives in Central Asia and associated military cooperation, Tajikistan has sourced drones from fellow Persian speaking Iran in the past.  Although Tajikistan has purchased TB2 drones from Türkiye as well, Iranian arms sales were especially noteworthy between 2022 and 2023, when tensions over the un-demarcated border with Kyrgyzstan flared, producing a short-lived, small-scale arms race punctuated by fighting between the two countries. 

While Bishkek and Dushanbe now have largely diplomatically resolved the border issue, security will likely remain a priority for Dushanbe in the coming years.  This is especially due to neighboring Afghanistan and the growing threat of Islamic State Khorasan Providence (ISKP).  Heightened tensions might mean that Tajikistan will purchase more Iranian weapons in the coming years – something that Pezeshkian would likely welcome, given his call to extend assistance to neighboring countries.  Iran, like many countries, also has significant concerns relating to ISKP, which in January 2024 conducted a major suicide bombing in Iran using Tajik nationals, killing upwards of 90 people. 

Pezeshkian has come to power with outward rhetoric offering a pragmatic and cooperative approach to international affairs.  He has also assumed power during a period which is already undergoing reproachment with Azerbaijan, a strengthening alliance with Russia, and increased trade with Central Asia and China.  Tehran is building infrastructure and adapting to its geopolitical and economic opportunities.  To fully realize the opportunities of recent regional openings and developments, though, it appears that Tehran could double down on the significance of the Caspian.