Kyrgyzstan reportedly foiled a coup attempt orchestrated by the Islamic State and arrested 30 militants this month.  While it would not be the first time Kyrgyz authorities have claimed to have stopped such a coup, the recent headline stories underscore the continued threat that the Islamic State, and more particularly the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), poses to Central Asia. 

Recent years have seen a notable increase in ISKP activity either targeting Central Asia or being perpetrated by Central Asians abroad.  The Islamic State itself has grown its online propaganda targeting Central Asians, expanding into Uzbek-, Tajik-, and Russian-language media. Operating from bases in northern Afghanistan, ISKP attacked Uzbekistan and Tajikistan for the first time in 2022.

Of all Central Asians, Tajik nationals appear to be particularly at risk for recruitment. High profile attacks, such as the Kermon bombing in Iran and the Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow, were both attributed to Tajik attackers, as have been several other attacks across the globe. Tajiks have been involved in attacks or attempted attacks as far off as Germany and Türkiye. A 2024, West Point analysis concluded that within ISKP’s “Central Asian mobilization campaign, its Tajik contingent appears to have emerged as its leading unit involved in external operations.”

Economic and political frustrations at home likely contribute to this radicalization, with ISKP propaganda videos regularly targeting Central Asian governments, promising viewers social justice and an alternative to their home governments.   However, personal networks also appear to be highly important in extremist recruitment. Specific locations, such as prisons in Central Asia, are believed to be major centers of recruitment. One study of Central Asian radical Islamist fighters found that just a handful of economically and politically marginalized zip codes, “hot spots,” were responsible for the majority of recruits. 

Additionally, global events, such as the ongoing war in Gaza, could well be contributing to this radicalization. Uzbek and Tajik branches of ISKP are utilizing the destruction of Gaza in online channels to spread antisemitism, anti-Shia sentiment, propaganda, and to raise funds. 

Central Asian governments, in turn, have responded by cracking down on suspected extremists but also on Islam more generally. In the aftermath of the Crocus City Hall attack in Russia, Kyrgyz authorities confiscated the passports of Muslim officials and Imams. In recent months, both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan banned outward signs of religiosity, including “foreign clothing” such as the hijab.  Counter-terrorism experts warn these tactics are usually ineffective in deterring extremism and could serve to radicalize Muslims. 

For the future, a comprehensive anti-terror strategy would seem to require much more than the reflexive clampdown on Islam. One analysis suggested that Tajikistan work to improve conditions at home while forming productive cooperative anti-terrorism relations with Russia, China, and even Taliban authorities in Afghanistan, who have claimed they will clamp down on ISKP in Afghanistan. Other potential measures suggested include “a unified regional approach based on shared intelligence, leadership targeting, and human-security measures.” Experts appear to agree, though, that addressing rot grievances at home should be the core to any approach.  Until such larger steps are taken, the threat of extremist recruitment could well continue to plague Central Asia.