CPC - Caspian Policy Center

Research

implementing the k-silk road: south korea’s growing commitment to central asia

Implementing the K-Silk Road: South Korea’s Growing Commitment to Central Asia

Author: Maia Kiniyalocts

01/31/2025

Image source: Office of the President of the Republic of Korea

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, sanctions and a costly war effort have weakened Russian influence within Central Asia.  Whereas the region was once seen as a subject of Moscow’s sphere of influence, in recent years these countries have branched out and begun to diversify their international relationships. While the United States and China are highlighted as potential pivotal partners, South Korea has long been involved in the region and is stepping up its game. 

In June 2024, South Korean President Yoon Suk-Yeol undertook a Central Asian tour, visiting Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.  This extensive visit launched the President’s new K-Silk Road Program, an all-encompassing South Korean initiative in Central Asia, covering raw materials and minerals, development aid, cultural exchange, and collaboration.  The roll-out of this program is now not only being implemented, but continues to grow in new areas.  While this program is not the country’s first partnership in the region, with past South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s attempt to establish a “Silk Road of Steel,” Yoon’s program continues to expand and is an important step towards further South Korean business integration.

Cooperation among Central Asian countries and South Korea has increased in both private and public levels since Yoon’s visit.  During various meetings and conferences, officials signed numerous agreements and Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) centered around furthering economic and energy cooperation, education, and remittance opportunities.

A stand-out aspect of the K-Silk Road Program is its transportation-centered development agreements.  During Yoon’s Central Asia trip, the Hyundai Rotem Corporation, a South Korean equipment developer, obtained a $196 million order from Uzbekistan for high-speed trains.  This deal is notable because it was granted less than a month prior to meetings between Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Russia’s President Vladamir Putin to expand bilateral cooperation in several sectors, including transportation.  The timing of the two meetings would seem to indicate that, despite continued collaboration with Russia, Uzbekistan is not seeking a singular partner for transport development agreements.  

Additionally, in July 2024 the Ministry of Transport of Tajikistan and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) started talks to conduct a feasibility study for the Jaloliddin-Balkhi – Panji-Poyon railway project.  This railway would help connect Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan (also known as the TAT project) and would compete with the Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Oman route.

As well as transportation, energy and mineral extraction are a focal point of the K-Silk road program.  On December 9, 2024, resource-rich Tajikistan hosted a roundtable with South Korean officials for the first time, discussing topics of geological exploration, training programs, investment, and how best to process minerals.  South Korea has also signed MoUs with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to improve their critical minerals supply chain.  Additionally, KazMunayGas, Kazakhstan’s national oil and gas company, has an agreement with South Korea to collaborate within the oil, gas, and petrochemical industries. 

Another pivotal pillar of Yoon’s K-Silk Road Program is economic collaboration and migration.  Private South Korean industries are investing and incorporating themselves into the region, such as KT&G, South Korea’s largest tobacco company, which plans to open a subsidiary in Uzbekistan.  Outside of private industries, a stand-out improvement is remittance policies.  For over a decade, citizens from Central Asia have migrated to Korea for work – a trend that has increased in the past few years.  In 2024, multiple agreements were released to expand remittance possibilities for Central Asians.  One is an MoU signed in October 2024 with Tajikistan to incorporate Tajik citizens into South Korea’s Employment Permit System.

These Tajik workers join Uzbekistani and Kyrgyzstani citizens who qualify for South Korea’s E-9 “Non-Professional Employment” visa.  Under Yoon, the prevalence of E-9 visas among Uzbek laborers has grown.  In May 2024, Uzbekistan’s Minister of Employment, Behzod Musaev, met with the Korean Minister of Labor and Employment, Lee Jung-sik, to discuss improvements in labor relations.  As part of this agreement, South Korea  increased the number of Uzbeks permitted to apply for the E-9 visa from an average of 60,000 per year to 100,000

These numbers are important considering developments in Russia, which remains the overwhelming destination for Central Asian labor migrants.  Russia has recently tightened labor restrictions on Central Asian migrants amid an increasingly xenophobic atmosphere, and with countries like Uzbekistan already increasing their labor cooperation with South Korea (with $420 million sent back in 2024 alone) it seems likely other Central Asian countries will follow suit.

The K-Silk Road initiative presents significant opportunities for South Korea in Central Asia and actualizes the region’s further departure from reliance on Russia.  In November 2024, South Korea hosted the 17th Central Asia-Republic of Korea Cooperation Forum, where 300 important business and government leaders met to discuss topics like digitalization, terrorism, and climate change.  The standout result from the forum was an agreement to host the first Korean-Central Asian summit sometime in 2025.

Yoon’s policy towards the Central Asian region is a positive change in commitment from South Korea.  Development cooperation, economic collaboration, and improving labor relations give greater leverage to the countries of Central Asia against Russia.  The increased need in this region for diverse investments indicates that even with President Yoon’s uncertain political future (after his failed call for martial law), South Korea’s involvement in Central Asia is likely to withstand conflicts in party politics. 2024 marked a year of growth in South Korean-Central Asian relations, one that depicts a promising future of collaboration and connection for years to come.


Related Articles

New Years Addresses: The Caspian Region in 2025

In much of Eastern Europe and Eurasia, New Year’s Eve remains the central holiday of the year and Presidential ...

COP 29: The Caspian COP

COP Climate Summits are exhausting events. The stakes are high and most COPs fall well short of expectations