With plans for a nuclear reactor well underway in Kazakhstan, it is important that the public understands the risks and rewards of an atomic era for the country. In addition to my recently published interview with Aldiyar Toktarov, Chairman of the Atomic Industry Development Association, I had the pleasure of connecting with three other nuclear experts. Each offered insights and observations that are helpful in grasping the potential and possible challenges that nuclear power presents for Kazakhstan,
Reflections on Risk
Nicholas Pomeroy, a Senior Energy Executive with an extensive working experience in Kazakhstan’s energy sector, remarked that “the primary risks include: safety and security, waste management, financial and project management risks,” as well as “geopolitical risks.” He explained that “modern reactor designs have strong safety systems, but Kazakhstan must develop an emergency preparedness plan that accounts for worst-case scenarios.” Regarding the waste-management risks, his idea was that “long-term disposal and storage solutions should be addressed from the outset.” By “financial risks” he explained that he meant that “large-scale infrastructure projects often face cost overruns,” and, therefore, “strict financial controls and governance mechanisms will be vital.” Touching on the topic of geopolitical risks, Pomeroy stated that “given nuclear energy’s strategic significance, Kazakhstan must ensure energy independence while managing relationships with key technology suppliers.”
Benjamin Godwin, Partner at the London-based Prism Strategic Intelligence Ltd identified “several risks” for the future nuclear power plant. He believes that “there is a minor risk of popular opposition due to cost and environmental concerns.” He added that “some citizens also appear concerned about the potential role of Russia in the project.” In addition, “A larger risk might be delays on the project for fiscal reasons,” said Godwin. Godwin reminded me that “the government is engaged in a process of fiscal consolidation due to increasing budget deficits – the president said last month that everyone needs to ‘tighten their belts’.” In his opinion, “This project will have to compete with other major infrastructure projects in energy and transport at a time when the government is reluctant to take on new financial obligations.” Godwin underlined that “sanctions is another major risk." In his opinion, it is “likely that Rosatom will have a role in the project. While the company itself has not been designated, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) reports that 70 actions have been taken against Rosatom subsidiaries and individuals affiliated with the company,” he remarked. Godwin said that “these sanctions do not prohibit Kazakhstan – or Western vendors – from working with Rosatom on the project. EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan stated much the same last month, describing Kazakhstan’s choice of partners as a ‘sovereign decision.’ Despite that, Godwin noted that “the company could be subjected to additional sanctions that would make it impossible to participate in the project – or severely impede its ability to deliver.” He also explained that “Russian financial institutions involved in the financing of the project could be subjected to sanctions.”
When asked for his view on the risks of the plant, Biplab Rakshi, Managing Director for Atomic Acquisitions, mentioned that “beside construction risk which will have knock-on effects on the financials (financing account for over 70% of costs on a 10-year build program), these need to be mitigated with sufficient contingency.” He emphasized that “more importantly having an effective supply chain/skilled resources will be essential.” In Rakshi’s opinion, “Irrespective of what commercial structure is adopted (PPA with CfD, vendor finance – ECA), the engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) and vendor needs to have sufficiently deep pockets to absorb in case of cost overruns.” He said that “RaB is slightly different but required a regulator who understands what is in scope and what is not.” “Ultimately,” he claimed, “project delays manifest in a financial consequence, this needs to be mitigated between Partners/Consortium with those best placed to take on those risks.”
Mistakes to be Avoided
Nicholas Pomeroy shared his opinion that the country “should take a phased, transparent approach to nuclear development, ensuring rigorous regulatory oversight, international best practices, and strong public engagement.” He emphasized that “the country can draw valuable lessons from its experience with large-scale oil and gas projects in western Kazakhstan over the past 25 years. Projects like Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak have demonstrated the importance of careful planning, regulatory compliance, and technology transfer while also highlighting challenges such as cost overruns, environmental concerns, and balancing foreign investment with national interests.” He stated that “by applying the lessons learned from its oil and gas megaprojects, Kazakhstan can approach nuclear energy development with a more structured, risk-managed strategy.”
Biplab Rakshi informed me that “the key is to plan, have contingency, and have quick path to resolution.” In particular, he noted that “having a prudent (plan for cost overruns) and coherent regulatory framework is essential.” In his opinion, “Ensuring the supply chain is ready and having the right commercial structure with the right program controls where risk is apportioned appropriately will also be critical.”
In addition, he said that “large nuclear by definition is complex where retrospective changes should be avoided.” He emphasized that “GW reactors are stick built, and often engineers tweak the design which has consequences. Having the right EPC especially for the nuclear island, someone who understands local conditions can only help.” Rakshi also noted the value of structure and supply chain. “Overall, it is important that the commercial structure is aligned and the supply chain is capable,” concluded Rakshi. “Knowledge transfer from other countries will also help.” He gave an example of “UK, U.S., and Canadian regulators clubbing together to learn from each other” and remarked that there might be an “opportunity for Kazakhstan.”
Contractor Criteria
Pomeroy shared his opinion that “Kazakhstan should prioritize companies with a proven track record of delivering nuclear projects on time and within budget.” Such a company, he believes should have an “experience with modern, safe reactor technologies (e.g., Gen III+ or small modular reactors).” The future contractor, he claimed, should have “a commitment to technology transfer and local workforce development” and “strong safety and environmental credentials.”
Godwin thinks that “Kazakhstan appears to be setting up a consortium in line with its wider multi-vector foreign policy, which appears to be very sound.”
Rakshi believes that when choosing a company to build a nuclear station in Kazakhstan we must understand that “experience always helps. but, more importantly, ensuring a supply chain aligned to the vendor technology is essential.” He remarked that “you can adopt the UAE model where the whole supply chain was Korean. For some others, like in the UK, 80% is local content. The need to train and upskill indigenous skills and development may also be a critical factor.” “Ultimately,” he said, “Kazakhstan needs to decide if it wants to adopt the Bangladesh model, leave it to the vendor, including the finance, or the UK, or something in between.” He noted an important consideration in stating: “With the first, you pass on the risk but lose control.”
Building Numerous Stations
Pomeroy believes that “building multiple stations could create economies of scale, enhance energy security, and accelerate Kazakhstan’s transition to low-carbon energy.” However, he pointed out risks that include “overstretching resources.” He argued that "developing one station first allows for lessons to be learned before scaling up.” Another risk, in Pomeroy’s opinion, is “financial strain — large-scale projects require significant upfront capital.” He added that “public and environmental concerns’ can also be a risk here. He explained that “a staggered approach may help build public trust and refine regulatory frameworks.” Pomeroy concluded by noting that “a phased rollout, starting with one station, then scaling based on demand and experience, would be a more prudent strategy.”
Godwin thinks “that it is unlikely that the stations will be built in parallel. “This would be extremely costly and technically very difficult,” he said. “It appears that the government is looking to create a pipeline of projects which would encourage local companies and experts to invest in expertise and technology.” Godwin claimed, “If it is clear that Kazakhstan is making a long term commitment to nuclear energy, investors will also dedicate resources to new technical, engineering, and scientific capability.” This, he believes, “should create a whole new industry for Kazakhstan – and significant numbers of jobs.” A “parallel” here, he noted “would be the large oil-services sector in Western Kazakhstan, which is a major employer.”
Rakshi observed that “having multiple programs has its benefits in that the supply chain can be motivated and easily accessible – improved knowledge transfer. System costs could be lower, e.g., a centralized cement factory servicing all.” However, he remarked, “there is a balance… The supply chain especially in human capital may be stretched.”
Assuring the Public about the Safety and Potential Benefits of Nuclear Power
Pomeroy thinks that “public confidence is key to the success of Kazakhstan’s nuclear program.” He indicated that “a major challenge is Kazakhstan’s long and dark history with [Soviet] nuclear testing at Semipalatinsk, which has left deep scars in the national memory.” However, he emphasized that “it is crucial to distinguish between nuclear power and nuclear weapons, as they are fundamentally different.” He went on to explain that ‘while nuclear weapons were developed for destructive purposes, nuclear power is a well-established technology used to generate clean, stable electricity.” He believes that Kazakhstan can address nuclear power concerns by “emphasizing modern reactor safety and operational practices/standards.” He said that “unlike Chernobyl’s outdated RBMK reactor, today’s nuclear designs include multiple layers of passive safety.” Another factor at play is “transparent risk communication…the government must proactively educate the public on safety measures, emergency preparedness, and waste management.” He also thinks that “highlighting environmental benefits” is another key moment to assure the public. “Nuclear provides stable, low-carbon energy, reducing dependence on fossil fuels,” observed Pomeroy. In his opinion, “engaging communities early” will also be crucial to creating trust. “Public forums and independent oversight mechanisms can build trust and dispel misinformation,” said Pomeroy. He believes that “Kazakhstan has a unique opportunity to shape its energy future responsibly. A well-executed nuclear program, complemented by renewables and hydrogen, can help the country transition to a sustainable, low-carbon economy.”
Godwin believes that “transparency and extensive communication, as well as education, is critical to the understanding of the industry.” He believes that “nuclear energy is safe and used across the world without difficulty.” “Given Kazakhstan’s specific history,” he said, “it may take more work to make people comfortable with the idea.” He does think, however, that “people understand that the technology is critical to both the energy security of Kazakhstan, as well as its economic development.”
Rakshi said that “nuclear has moved on since Chernobyl. New Gen 3+ designs have all been updated with better passive safeguards.” He said that “since 911, they are all plane-crashe resistant.” He noted, “One may argue that some of the designs have gone over the top in terms of the number of active/passive safeguards (more complex to operate).” Rakshi indicated that “Gen 4 reactors have added benefits in that fuel technology has progressed and TRISO fuel are more proliferation resistant. Some are even ceramic coated. However, most Gen 4 reactors are not gigawatt but SMR in design. The EPZ have become smaller as a result.” He said that "stakeholder engagement and assurance take time but can be done – in the 90’s, the UK was anti-nuclear, but now it is pro-. Sweden stopped nuclear, but now wants to build. Most countries want net zero [energy], and nuclear is the only base-load option. You cannot store wind.”
“Kazakhstan ultimately needs to decide if it wants centralized GW nuclear power generation or a more distributed system,” noted Rakshi. “In Canada, which has lot of remote communities and mining activities, there is a focus on SMR’s because they offer both heat and power on a distributed basis,” he said. Rakshi distilled his thoughts to a central question: “Bottom line: does Kazakhstan want to develop its own capabilities or be reliant on others? Financing/local content is also another factor. The choice is yours.”
Conclusion
Speaking with a range of knowledgeable experts on the topic of nuclear power, provided both reassurance and important insights. There is a promising path forward for Kazakhstan in terms of nuclear power. It must, however, be skillfully navigated. Kazakhstan will need to martial its internal resources while also being open to learning from the successes and failures of other countries with nuclear power projects. The future might be bright, but harnessing that glow will take money, effort, and dedication, in a “powerful” combination.
