Gold has many colours.  There is the familiar yellow gold, of course, whose price has been rising again over the past year. But “black gold” and “white gold” are also widely known: Black gold, the oil that has brought riches to producing countries; and white gold, or cotton. Central Asia has all three colours of gold in abundance, and all three have played an important role in the region’s history and development.  At the same time, all three have provoked controversy, whether for their impact on people, the environment, or the politics around them.  This is - mainly - a story of white gold.

But first, black gold. Everyone knows about Kazakhstan and its massive oil deposits. While the country is not as dependent as Azerbaijan on oil exports, its production is higher, and oil is inextricably linked to international investment and Kazakhstan’s relations with Russia. Western oil majors were the first big investors in post-independence Kazakhstan. And, as for Russia, it has long had a near stranglehold over Kazakhstan’s oil exports, a dependency which even the privately-owned CPC pipeline to Novorossiysk has done little to break, with the Kazakhs now looking at trans-Caspian shipments via Azerbaijan as one alternative.

Yellow gold itself plays an important economic role in Uzbekistan, accounting for around one third of exports in the world’s 10th largest producer. Kazakhstan itself is the 15th largest producer, and as for Kyrgyzstan, while the total production volumes are not high by international standards, the outsized economic and political role played by the country’s Kumtor mine has been a long-running saga.  The largest private sector employer and taxpayer, and previously owned by a Canadian firm, Kumtor had long been the target of Kyrgyz politicians since the country’s independence, eventually being nationalised. Were foreign investors benefiting from a favourable deal, or is it a story of local politicians wanting to take over an investment once it was profitable? Whatever the case, accusations of corruption and mismanagement have quickly re-emerged under government ownership and management of the mine.

But it’s white gold - cotton - which has probably played the most contentious role in Central Asia. It is grown in all five countries of the region, most prominently in Uzbekistan (world’s eighth largest producer) and Turkmenistan (13th largest producer).  

The history of cotton in the world is one of exploitation - imperial, economic, labour, environmental - and Central Asia is no exception.  The growing of cotton in Central Asia originated from India via Persia, probably around 2000 years ago, though for a long time it wasn’t large-scale.  Strange as it may seem, it was the American Civil War that sparked the large-scale planting of cotton in Central Asia.

While Russia had previously imported some raw cotton from the region, its lower quality and the long overland journey by camel meant that American cotton was far more preferable. But the American civil war blocked the export of cotton from the US, leading to a global cotton famine and sending prices skyrocketing. Britain was able to ramp up production of raw cotton in India, but Russia for its part focused on colonising Central Asia and enforcing the growing of cotton on a large scale. It’s important to recognise that mass cotton growing in Central Asia was not solely an outcome of Russian imperialism, but also one of its drivers.

Between 1870 and 1917, the land in Central Asia devoted to cotton increased by 50 times, and Russia became one of the top producers globally. And, similar to Britain’s approach towards India, Russia imported the raw cotton and exported finished textiles back to the region. This unbalanced relationship continued under the USSR, with a dramatic increase in production. Output in Uzbekistan - the main producer, representing around 70% of the Soviet total - peaked in the late 1980s.

But while the collapse of the USSR and independence brought an end to imperial exploitation, it left a terrible legacy, with the collapse of industrial linkages between the successor states, a lack of diversification, environmental catastrophes and a centralised system of top-down governance. This legacy has hampered change, and, sadly, other forms of exploitation - environmental, labour – have continued. 

The destruction of the Aral Sea is well documented. The sea has lost 90% of its size since the 1960s, largely due to the riparian states taking so much of the water of the main rivers - the Syr Darya and Amu Darya - for agriculture.  90% of water in Uzbekistan is used for agriculture. And it’s cotton that is the big consumer of this water - it’s estimated that one kilogramme of cotton needs 10,000 litres of water, which in rainfall-poor Central Asia essentially means irrigation. And that’s before looking at the water used for textile production, the salinisation of the soil and rivers caused by water shortages, and the pollution of the soil and air with particles from the exposed seabed, with the consequent damage to health. 

Labour exploitation has also been an ongoing theme. In both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan there has been controversy over the use of child labour and forced labour to pick the cotton. Both countries have been subject to calls for boycotts. And in both countries the governments have controlled production and prices. In recent years, Uzbekistan has moved away from this system, and the International Labour Organisationannounced in 2022 that the Uzbek cotton industry was free from child and forced labour. Production quotas have been abolished, and privately-owned companies have taken charge of the harvest (though accusations remain that these companies are still exploiting farmers). In Turkmenistan, however, while the government is increasingly employing mechanisation to replace picking cotton by hand, forced labour is still prevalent according to the Cotton Campaign, which continues to call for a boycott of Turkmenistan’s cotton. 

In discussing cotton production and exploitation in Central Asia, it would be remiss not to make a brief reference to the Chinese region of Xinjiang, the source of 80% of China’s cotton production (China is the world’s second largest producer). Sadly, the same stories are repeating themselves, with a colonial power destroying the environment and forcing the population to grow cotton despite water scarcity.

Concerns about a lack of water in Central Asia are mounting as climate change affects rainfall and glaciers, and demands for water increase. Logically, the countries should move away from growing cotton. And it’s certainly the case that Uzbekistan has given greater weight to food crops. But cotton provides export revenues and employment (up to 2 million people are involved in the cotton harvest in Uzbekistan, the world’s largest organised seasonal activity), and provides a reason for people to stay in rural areas rather than move to the cities. So any policy change will require careful planning and sensitive implementation. This needs to start now, before increasing water scarcity simply causes the long term and unmanaged decline of the industry. White gold will not last forever.