Following the end of the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Azerbaijan began restoring direct transport links with its exclave in Armenia, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (NAR). Thus, activating the Zangezur (Nakhchivan or Syunik) Corridor and connecting it to the international transport network came up on the agenda.
The project is important not only from the point of view of connecting Azerbaijan with its closest ally, Turkiye, but also for expanding regional ties between East Asia and Europe. Central Asian states, which are rapidly developing trade with both the Turkic world and Western economies, are extremely interested in these new ties.
Economic effect of Zangezur
The Zangezur Corridor is a 43-kilometer road from Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic through the Syunik region of Armenia. On Azerbaijani territory, the route links to the Horadiz-Agbend transport highway. On Turkish territory, it connects with the Nakhchivan-Igdir-Kars double-track railway and highway. The construction of this section is expected to take five years.
The 44-day Karabakh war, which concluded with the victory of Azerbaijan, obliged Armenia to ensure access for citizens as well as transport and cargo to Nakhchivan, and to ensure their unimpeded through movement. In essence, this meant lifting the heavy transport and economic blockade that the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic had been under since 1989.
It is premature to talk about the full-fledged operation of the Zangezur route. However, Azerbaijan is already completing the construction of the railway in the Nakhchivan direction. The route from the city of Horadiz to the village of Agbend bordering Iran and Armenia will be duplicated by a highway. Both projects will become part of the Zangezur Corridor, which, in turn, will provide Eurasian exporters with relatively quick access to the markets of Turkiye and the European Union. Incidentally, this is precisely what sparked the high interest of Uzbekistan and its neighbors in using the Azerbaijani exclave as a transit territory for transporting goods to Europe.
The Zangezur Corridor shortens the route from Azerbaijan to Turkiye and back. Currently, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway is used for trans-Caucasian international transportation. Freight trains need to travel 250 km through Georgian territory, while only 43 km along the Zangezur Corridor. If we take into account that the railway tracks will be extended to the border village of Agbend, the distance between Turkiye and Azerbaijan will be reduced by a total of 343 km, providing huge savings in time and money for transporting goods. Moreover, the effect is scalable for all countries participating in the Europe-China-Europe logistics chain.
Benefits for Central Asia
As the shortest land route from Asia to Europe, the Zanzegur Corridor opens up great prospects for the development of trans-Caspian transportation, which involves almost all of Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
Both regions are located at the intersection of the intercontinental trade routes East-West, North-South. The transport corridors Asia Pacific countries-Europe, Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor, pass through their territory. After the outbreak of war in Ukraine and the subsequent sanctions blockade of the northern routes through Russia and Belarus, these projects have become especially relevant.
Due to the Ukrainian crisis, China has had to reorient land-freight traffic in the European direction from the Northern Corridor to the Middle Corridor. As a result, the transit significance of Central Asia for global manufacturers has increased many times over, and with it the load on the region’s transport infrastructure. A similar situation has developed in the South Caucasus.
With the increased importance of the Middle Corridor, the issue of increasing the efficiency of its key sections, especially the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, which does not yet have a functional analogue, is becoming more intensified. By now, the capacity of the highway has been increased to 5 million tons per year instead of the previous 1 million tons. The measure is necessary, but not exhaustive. Another option for unloading the transport hub is the creation of an alternative corridor through Nakhchivan.
The road through Armenia to Nakhchivan facilitates access of the countries of East, Central, and South Asia to the European market via land routes, which will add to them a degree of competitive advantage. Here, first of all, it is worth mentioning that the Middle Corridor, commencing at the western borders of China, crosses Central Asia (via Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan), the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Turkiye, reaching the borders of the European Union. Cargo delivery by the traditional scheme using the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway takes two weeks (for comparison: along the Northern Corridor – 16 days). By replacing the Georgian section of the route with the Zangezur one, the travel time can be reduced by an additional day. As it is known, every extra hour or kilometer increases the cost of transport services and transit, which negatively affects the dynamics of foreign trade.
However, the functioning of the Zangezur Corridor will not diminish the importance of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway line. Rather, both of the two routes will become complementary. Their subsequent connection, which will increase the capacity of the Baku-Kars railway by four times, is also possible. This will certainly lead to an expansion of the region’s logistics capabilities and increase external demand for transit services.
The launch of the Zangezur route fully meets the geo-economic interests of the Central Asian “five” that were among the first to support this initiative. Uzbekistan, for example, has repeatedly expressed solidarity with Baku on the Zangezur issue, appealing to the strategic role of the road through Nakhchivan. In view of Tashkent’s prioritization of Trans-Caspian transportation in trade with the countries of the South Caucasus, Turkiye, and the European Union, shortening the Middle Corridor provides a proportional benefit in the form of a reduction in transport and transit costs, which will allow Uzbek goods to meet price competition on world markets.
It is important to note that, along with the Trans-Caspian Corridor, Uzbekistan also relies on Iranian transit when exporting its products to Turkiye and the European Union, where ferry transportation is not used. Therefore, theoretically, the railway route through Iran seems to be the simplest, but less stable due to the current sanctions against the Islamic Republic. In this regard, it seems appropriate to continue the line of diplomatic support for Azerbaijan in creating the Zangezur Corridor, relying exclusively on the economic, rather than political and especially ideological component of this concept.
Neighbors’ concerns
The implementation of the Zangezur Corridor is mainly difficult because of the ambiguous position of Iran and Armenia regarding the project.
Iran is concerned about the opening of the Zangezur Corridor because Tehran views it as a political underpinning of Turkiye, which, as Tehran believes, in tandem with Baku, seeks to unite the entire Turkic world within a single transport ring.
From the position of the Islamic Republic, such an approach poses a threat to its national and regional interests.
First, Iran does not want its role in the region to be weakened by strengthening the Turkish factor by pushing through a transport initiative that could easily “swallow up” Armenia, Tehran’s strategic ally in the South Caucasus.
Second, Iran fears for its northern provinces, where the ethnic Azerbaijani population predominates. There are known subversive campaigns, when the crowd is charged with ideas about annexing northern Iran, and recently the Syunik (Zangezur) region of Armenia, to Azerbaijan.
Tehran sees a European trace in such unrest and considers NATO involved in the creation of the Zangezur route. The project is presented to the North Atlantic Alliance as the “Turan Corridor,” which could lead NATO directly to the northern border of Iran, the southern border of Russia, and western China.
Armenia also resists the emergence of the Zangezur Corridor. Yerevan fears that after the construction of the highways, the country will be cut off from the Iranian border, and Baku will lay claim to the Syunik region. In addition, the Armenian side is concerned that the highway leading to Nakhchivan could come under Russian control.
Over the past year, there have been many expectations that Azerbaijan and Armenia will finally manage to put an end to their historic discord and conclude a peace treaty. However, the parties have not yet reached a full consensus, which is delaying the resolution of the Zangezur issue.
However, Azerbaijan has an alternative – to use the Iranian highway along the border Aras river or the so-called Aras Corridor. To do this, it is enough to build two automobile bridges from Agbend to the Iranian province of East Azerbaijan, and from there to the Ordubad region of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. It is planned to build a railway and two railway bridges along the same route.
For a long time, experts and analysts were inclined to think that the Iranian alternative to the Zangezur route was hopeless due to the complicated relationship between Baku and Tehran, as well as the latter’s dissatisfaction with the politicization of this project by Turkiye. However, Azerbaijan has turned the situation in a positive direction.
In October 2023, the parties agreed to create a transport corridor to Nakhchivan via Iran. It is unclear under what terms Tehran was persuaded to accept such a deal. Most likely, it was promised to maintain a privileged status in the transit of goods and energy resources in the Turkish-European direction. It is obvious that Azerbaijan decided to compromise with Iran on the Zangezur issue due to Armenia’s persistent unwillingness to provide its territory for communication with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.
A subsequent round of negotiations on the construction of the Aras route took place in October 2024 in Tehran between the heads of the railway administrations of Iran and Azerbaijan. Such progress should be an alarming signal for Armenia that risks losing a unique chance to become part of international transit and thereby to gain geopolitical weight.
The launch of the Zangezur Corridor, among other things, will allow Yerevan to establish a railway connection with Iran, as well as acquire a safe land route in the Russian direction. The latter is critically important for Yerevan, given the high volume of trade between the countries. Currently, Armenia and Russia are connected by only one road, passing through Georgia. This route is unstable, as it is periodically closed due to bad weather conditions. Sometimes this closure also happens due to political squabbles between Tbilisi and Moscow. In addition, there are security issues due to the difficult terrain along which the road is laid.
Currently, Azerbaijan seeks to develop both routes to connect with Nakhchivan – Armenian and Iranian. In 2025, it is planned to commission the Horadiz-Agbend railway, which will become part of the Zangezur Corridor. Its next section, passing through Turkiye, will be launched in 2029. If the appropriate infrastructure is ready, Armenia’s refusal to establish transport links through its territory is unlikely to be harmful for Baku, due to the availability of a backup option using Iranian transit to reach Nakhchivan. This scenario is a priori accepted by external actors, including all five Central Asian states.
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AUTHOR’S BIO: Nargiza Umarova is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED), and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution, “Knowledge Caravan”, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
Her research activities are focused on studying the developments of Central Asia, trends in regional integration, and the influence of big powers on this process. Also she explores the current policy of Uzbekistan on the creation and development of international transport corridors.
