Last week the Azerbaijani and Armenian governments announced they had reached agreement on the text of a draft peace treaty. This is an historic moment, both for the hope that it will bring an end to their long-running conflict, and because the treaty was negotiated bilaterally, without the need for outside mediation. The remaining two articles just agreed cover the withdrawal of legal claims against each other in international courts, and agreement not to host foreign missions on the border (aimed at the EU Mission to Armenia, which currently monitors the border).

Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan immediately said that he was ready to discuss a place and time for signature of the agreement. Baku, meanwhile, was more circumspect, noting its long-held demands that Armenia should first amend its constitution to remove implicit territorial claims against Azerbaijan, and that the two sides should support the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group and related structures. 

Many in Baku see Pashinyan’s statement as aimed at encouraging Western pressure on Azerbaijan to sign before resolution of these two issues, similar to Armenia’s earlier attempts to persuade Azerbaijan to drop non-agreed articles from the treaty. Certainly, Western governments are very likely to favour treaty signature quickly, before circumstances in the region change.

However, Baku is unlikely to be rushed. To his credit, Pashinyan has previously expressed understanding of the requirement to change the constitution (which he wants to do anyway for domestic reasons) and to disestablish the Minsk Group. The dilemma he faces – particularly on the constitution – is one of timing and of not wanting to give the opposition the chance to criticise him for changing the constitution at the behest of Azerbaijan. The parliamentary elections in Armenia, expected by June 2026, will be at the forefront of his mind.

There are a number of ways that this circle could be squared. For instance, the 1998 Good Friday Agreement that brought peace to Northern Ireland included a sequencing of events – including a referendum on changes to the Republic of Ireland constitution - that had to be met before the treaty would come into force. Deft handling between Azerbaijani and Armenian negotiators should be able to find a way through, even if the result is an interpretative statement by Azerbaijan upon signature. 

Beyond the peace treaty, there are a number of outstanding issues that the two sides need to resolve. The so-called Zangezur corridor, the land link from the main part of Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave, is still being negotiated outside the peace treaty. Both sides will benefit significantly from its opening, but it’s proving hard to nail down the specific arrangements. The fate of the Nagorno Karabakh Armenians currently on trial in Baku will need to be resolved (another dilemma for Pashinyan, who won’t want them to become figureheads for the opposition in Armenia if released as part of a broader deal). And the border delimitation talks – with which both sides have expressed satisfaction – need to continue to make progress. The return of Armenian Karabakhis to Nagorno Karabakh – and the mirror return of expelled Azerbaijanis to Armenia – is also out there, although if we’re honest it’s a subject that it suits both sides not to address.

With some strident opposition in Yerevan to a peace deal with Azerbaijan, much of the success of all of this is likely to depend on Pashinyan remaining in office. So Baku, too, will need to keep an eye on the Armenian elections, and – one would hope – take steps to allow Pashinyan to claim that his efforts towards peace are bearing fruit. 

One element of this is the Armenia-Turkey relationship. It is to be hoped that the agreement on the Azerbaijan-Armenia text will lead to the opening of the recently renovated Margara border crossing between Armenia and Turkey, even if wider normalisation and opening of full communication links have to wait for further progress on the remaining issues. 

The broader question beyond resolution of all the outstanding issues is how to promote reconciliation between the peoples of the countries. As has been observed, a peace treaty is not the same as peace, the latter needing broad acceptance by the population of the need to put the past conflicts behind them, and a reduction in hostile rhetoric. There is perhaps a sense that the Azerbaijani population is generally ready for this, though much of the Armenian public (and particularly the diaspora) - with the defeats of 2020 and 2023 still fresh – still appear to need time. This will need a rapid intensification of Track-II discussions that go beyond stating established positions and that promote reconciliation.

The list of issues still to be resolved is long and difficult, but for now we should celebrate the achievement of an agreement on the text of a peace treaty, something that would have been unthinkable at any time during the past 30 years. Historic indeed!