Statement before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in EuropeU.S. Helsinki Commission Staff

Commission Members and staff:  Thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony on the significant changes taking place in Central Asia (and the South Caucasus) as a result of the war in Ukraine, as well as the prospects for U.S. cooperation in addressing these challenges and opportunities.  The views expressed in this testimony are my own and do not represent those of any institutions that I am associated with.

Foreign policy experts tend to prefer continuity to disruption, stability to volatility. International relations scholarship reinforces this preference by clinging to established archetypes: balance of power, spheres of influence, and the seemingly self-evident axiom that small states are inevitably pawns in the struggles of Great Powers. Few regions are so habitually pigeonholed as Central Asia. Since independence, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan have been cast in Washington, Brussels, Moscow, and Beijing alike as vulnerable prizes in a “new Great Game,” more acted upon than acting.

However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changed everything for Central Asia. As a result, the Great Power framework is outdated. To persist in it is to miss not only the newfound agency of the Central Asian states themselves, but also the opportunities their assertiveness creates for the United States. These countries increasingly define themselves as “middle powers”—actors with enough weight, resources, and diplomatic creativity to resist domination, negotiate with multiple players, and pursue sovereign development strategies. Perpetuating the cliché and treating them solely as hostages to Great Power politics blinds us to this evolution, undercuts their efforts to assert independence, and risks leaving the field open to others with more parochial interests.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Moscow’s aggression has not cowed Central Asia into deference. Instead, it has accelerated a realignment, empowering these states to diversify away from the limitations of Soviet legacy infrastructure and Russia’s market stranglehold. It has also compelled Central Asian leaders to reinvest beyond their self-styled concept of “multi-vectoralism” of engaging simultaneously with multiple partners to counterbalance the often-overbearing interests of large neighbors Russia and China.  Now they seek alternatives and the embrace of other partners.

The time has come to update our framework thinking. Central Asia is no longer defined exclusively by Great Power Competition but by its own pursuit of sovereignty and regional integration. Exemplified in the region’s organic creation of a sanctions-alternative “Middle Corridor” trade route that redirects freight away from Russian infrastructure and connects Central Asia to China in the east and Europe via the Caspian, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye to the west. Supporting this shift is not just an economic matter but a geopolitical imperative: it is the surest way to reduce Russia’s coercive tendencies, to blunt China’s monopolization of connectivity, and to secure a more prosperous and independent Eurasia.

The Invasion That Changed the Rules

For Central Asia, Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 was a shock, but not yet a rupture. The violation of Ukrainian sovereignty undermined Moscow’s commitments from the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration, in which all post-Soviet states pledged to respect one another’s territorial integrity. That foundational commitment had been a keystone for interstate relations between the newly independent republics and for them to accept Russia as a partner in a “civilized divorce” from the Soviet empire. If Moscow could renege on that, what else might it discard?  

The answer came in February 2022, when Russia launched a massive second invasion of Ukraine. Moscow’s subsequent demands that Central Asian governments support its annexations or send troops were met with refusals. None recognized Russia’s territorial claims in Ukraine. Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev made a show of defiance, reaffirming his country’s sovereignty and directing his officials to coordinate with Western governments to prevent Russian sanctions evasion and to avoid any secondary sanctions.  The message was unmistakable: Moscow’s capacity to command deference was waning.

The war’s economic consequences underscored the urgency of diversification for Central Asia. Western sanctions on Russia ricocheted across the region, closing access to traditional markets in and through Russia, restricting banking and finance systems largely controlled by Moscow, as well as ceasing use of Russian transportation networks that had long been the region’s economic lifeline. Yet sanctions also created incentives. Faced with the risk of secondary sanctions themselves, Central Asian states began to scale back dependence on Russia, while simultaneously searching for new avenues of trade.  

Multi-Vectoralism Reborn

The desire to realign relations with its neighbors is not new. Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev pioneered “multi-vectoralism” to balance ties with Russia, China, the United States, and Europe, and as a means of pursuing sovereignty. Uzbekistan under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev also embraced the concept, working first to build positive relations among Central Asian countries. For decades, however, multi-vectoralism was less a genuine strategy than a polite fiction. Moscow’s legacy infrastructure—pipelines, rail lines, electricity grids—ensured that any real diversification remained limited, while China’s entry into the region via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) added a new layer of dependence and need for counterbalancing mechanisms.

However, the region’s external relations have changed dramatically. The war in Ukraine, combined with sanctions pressure, catalyzed a search for alternative trading partners and business relations that is bearing fruit. New cooperative mechanisms were adopted to speed trade, add expanded capacity at Baku’s Alat Port, and multi-donor investments made in rail links through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. These efforts have transformed the Middle Corridor from a theoretical route into a viable lifeline. In 2021, trans-Caspian trade volume was a scant 586,000 tons; by 2024, it mushroomed to over four million tons for year-on-year growth of over 60 percent. Central Asian governments openly champion the Middle Corridor as a gateway to open trade and as a foundation for their sovereignty.

Remarkably, this change is not the product of external development efforts, but an organic process owned by the countries in the region, triggered by Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine. Central Asian states are for the first time investing in one another, pursuing collective diplomacy and joint projects that would have been unthinkable even five years ago. Regular presidential summits, initiatives for once-unthinkable cooperation on sensitive issues like regional water and energy, coordinated outreach to international partners, all reflect a new energy and sense of collective agency. In effect, Central Asia is learning to act as a bloc—not against Great Powers, but on its own terms with them.

A reemerging crossroads, the five countries of the region work to foster positive relations and agreements with bi- and multi-lateral partners.  Freed from the exclusivity and control associated with Russia’s Northern Corridor, Central Asia is building an alternative network of rail, road, and sea lanes that provide greater shipping flexibility and access.  Reserving the right to conduct their affairs independently, the countries continue to do business with their neighbors, but also now with access to new markets.  

Moscow Shrink/China Swell

Russia has not accepted this quietly. It has retaliated with its standard arsenal of hybrid tactics: throttling oil exports from Kazakhstan, striking Azerbaijani infrastructure that supports Central Asia’s energy transit, spreading disinformation and stoking hostility toward Central Asian migrant workers inside Russia.  But the impact of such intimidation is diminishing. 

In the 1990s and 2000s, even the threat of Moscow’s displeasure was often sufficient to curb thoughts of straying from Russia’s sphere of control. Today, these threats generate open resentment and encourage further diversification. Ironically, the more aggressively Russia uses its hybrid tools, the more rapidly Central Asian states work to find alternatives.

Much Western analysis of Central Asia presumes that if these states loosen ties with Moscow, they must inevitably then fall under Beijing’s sway. China is the region’s largest trading partner, a leading investor, and the source of much infrastructure financing and construction. Yet, the Central Asians are well aware of their large neighbors and the pitfalls of dependence.  To assume that Central Asia simply exchanges a master in Moscow for one in Beijing is to miss the essence of multi-vectoralism.

Central Asian capitals do not wish to be sucked into China’s orbit any more than Russia’s. They value Beijing’s capital and markets but are wary of debt dependence and potential strings attached to BRI projects. Their strategy is not alignment but diversification—leveraging China where it suits them, balancing it with ties to Europe, Türkiye, the Gulf, and, increasingly, the United States.  The Middle Corridor is critical to such balancing. 

Returning to its ancient Silk Road roots, Central Asia is seeking to return to a crossroads mentality of doing business openly with all customers.  By providing access to Europe without reliance on Russia, the Middle Corridor strengthens the region’s negotiating position. Moscow has tended to see economic relations in zero-sum terms, that have not favored Russia’s partners.  For Central Asia, the more its corridor grows, the less dependent the region is to any single external power or infrastructure system.

The South Caucasus and the US

The utility of the Middle Corridor hinges on stability in the South Caucasus. Here, too, old frameworks are shifting. For decades, Armenia and Azerbaijan were locked in a frozen conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, a standoff that Moscow exploited to maintain leverage over both. President Trump’s success in the reconciliation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan creates new possibilities and options. A stable agreement between Yerevan and Baku will enable Armenia to join the Middle Corridor, open its closed borders, and establish trade connectivity with Türkiye and Europe.  As agreed to be overseen by the United States, the development of such connectivity would come via a reconstructed Soviet-era rail line that could more than double the Middle Corridor’s freight capacity.

For Azerbaijan, this expansion would further solidify its role as a regional hub between Central Asia and Europe, reinforcing its energy and trade ambitions. For Armenia, the new rail line offers a chance to end isolation, diversify partnerships, and reduce reliance on Moscow. The peace process dovetails with Central Asia’s broader strategy of emancipation—reshaping regional connectivity in ways that sideline Russia’s role as the indispensable intermediary.

For the United States, the evolution of Central Asia from pawn to middle power has direct implications for global security and economic stability:  A more sovereign Central Asia is less susceptible to Russian coercion, reducing Moscow’s capacity to weaponize energy and infrastructure against its neighbors. Diversified connectivity weakens China’s efforts to control the development of Eurasian infrastructure, providing alternatives that benefit Europe and Asia alike. Finally, supporting Central Asia’s autonomy enhances resilience against potential extremist spillovers from Afghanistan, strengthening a region whose stability affects Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East.

Above all, engagement with Central Asia on its own terms offers the West an opportunity to demonstrate that U.S. and allied support is not conditional on alignment against China or Russia but rooted in respect for sovereignty and choice which is precisely what the region seeks.  This style of respectful engagement was the underpinning of Central Asia policy in the first Trump Administration.

Supporting the Middle Corridor and Middle Powers

Washington and its partners have an opportunity to make the Middle Corridor a strategic priority. That means investing in infrastructure, providing financing guarantees, supporting customs and regulatory harmonization, and facilitating digital and energy interconnections. It also means diplomatic support for the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, without which the corridor cannot reach its full potential.

Beyond the corridor, engagement should emphasize capacity building, strategic mineral development, and technology partnerships—areas where the United States offers value distinct from Russia and China.  Cooperation should be framed not as competition with Great Powers, but as support for and reinforcement of Central Asia’s own economic and geopolitical sovereignty.

Policy Recommendations

• Anchor U.S. Support to the Middle Corridor

The U.S. should make the Trans-Caspian trade route a flagship initiative backed by financing through the DFC, MCC, Ex-Im Bank, and World Bank coordination. The priority should be reducing bottlenecks: modernizing Caspian port facilities, enhancing corridor interoperability (rail, road, and sea), and harmonizing customs regimes. Washington can convene partners (EU, Türkiye, Japan, Korea) into a structured donor-investor group that drives progress beyond talk.

• Cement Regional Cooperation Through a Revamped “C5+U.S. 2.0” Framework

The C5+1 dialogue that brings the five Central Asian countries together with the United States should evolve on its tenth anniversary into a more expanded and institutionalized “2.0” version, that could include Azerbaijan…and maybe Armenia and Georgia, with permanent staffing and an expanded focus to include not only economic and energy issues, but also digital security, infrastructure finance, and governance. The signal would be clear: Washington sees the five as middle powers acting collectively, not pawns.

• Support Armenia–Azerbaijan Peace as a Corridor Enabler

Washington should treat the normalization of Armenia–Azerbaijan ties not just as conflict resolution but as a key element of corridor development. Quiet but consistent U.S. diplomacy should fund cross-border reconstruction projects and connect Armenian infrastructure to the Middle Corridor. A durable peace unlocks east–west trade sovereignty for the whole region. The Middle Corridor needs to continue to grow and become more cost efficient in order to compete against Russian infrastructure when the Ukraine war ends. 

• Expand Economic Diversification Programs to Reduce Russian and Chinese Leverage

The U.S. should help Central Asia replace overdependence on Beijing and Moscow by developing the region’s strategic mineral and rare earth industries, as well as its natural gas and oil capabilities.  U.S. trade promotion agencies, the DFC, and Ex-Im Bank should prioritize Central Asian projects with demonstrable diversification effects. Such next-step development and investment will reduce the region’s over-reliance on hydrocarbon extraction and foster more resilient economic diversification.

• Reframe Central Asia Policy Around Sovereignty, Not Great Power Competition

The U.S. should explicitly affirm the sovereignty and agency of Central Asia’s middle powers. A dedicated strategy document should set this tone, articulating a U.S. vision that invests in their independence, not in zero-sum competition.

U.S. policymakers should engage at this pivotal moment, investing in critical areas that underpin sovereignty and independence. The reward is substantial: a more sovereign, stable, secure, and resilient Eurasia, connected globally and less vulnerable to coercion by any single power.  Russia’s hybrid war is faltering and China’s dominance is not inevitable. The Middle Corridor, and the regional agency it represents, is the key to a new Eurasian order. 

For too long, analysts have seen Central Asian countries as minor players to Great Power rivalry. That description no longer fits. These five states are asserting agency, developing new connectivity, and forging collective strategies that weaken Moscow’s grip and complicate Beijing’s dominance. They are, in short, actually behaving as middle powers, choosing autonomy over dependence, pursuing sovereignty not as aspiration but as a matter of practice.

 

Dr. Eric Rudenshiold is a Senior Fellow at the Caspian Policy Center and a former National Security Council Director for Central Asia under Presidents Trump and Biden.