It was all smiles in Tianjin when President Xi Jinping welcomed his Russian and Indian counterparts for the annual Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit. Representing 35% of the world’s population, the three leaders made the most of the photo opportunity. The message to Western capitals was clear: The world order is changing and we are the change.

Yet, beyond the ceremony and symbolism of summitry, the SCO’s contributions to Eurasian regionalization included the unanimously signed Tianjin Declaration which established the SCO development bank with Beijing pledging $1.4 billion in loans over the next three years. However, since 2013 China has invested an estimated $1.3 trillion in funding as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing’s Tianjin funding pledge pales by comparison. As a result, it appears that China still considers the SCO a relatively symbolic Eurasian bloc, yet Beijing does see utility in making funding for BRI projects more attractive for states seeking infrastructure development. 

That said, the SCO summit reaffirmed interests in energy, green industry, digital economy, technological innovation, and education – issues that remain priority areas for both Beijing and the Caspian region. 

Absorbing the Middle Corridor? Unlikely.

Although the $1.4 billion SCO development bank pledge appears to be a significant investment, it is unclear if the funds will actually ever surface. In a similar gesture, President Xi promised to provide about $209 million for Central Asian development projects during the June 2025 C5+China Summit. Yet, outside of construction projects like the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, few new Chinese investments have yet to appear. In principle, these investments seem to signal China’s continued support and interest in the region, but in practice they raise questions. 

Beijing has made grandiose pledges before. After Tianjin, the question is how the SCO development bank’s funds will directly benefit member states. Middle Corridor connectivity is a key area of common interest between Central Asian capitals and Beijing.  However, past BRI projects have raised the specter of China overwhelming the region, turning it into a pass-through for goods traveling to European markets.  But until new funds are committed for infrastructure projects, the likelihood of China absorbing the Middle Corridor through general investment appears low. 

Along with the ambiguity behind its development funds, Beijing has not been the sole external actor interested in advancing the Middle Corridor. Last year, the European Union (EU) launched its Middle Corridor Coordinating Platform to implement priority projects in Türkiye and the Trans-Caspian region. The EU has already committed to two pledges, one in January 2024 and another in April 2025, totaling about $26 billion for Central Asian infrastructure and resource development. While the EU has also previously promised funds yet to materialize, those amounts were smaller. 

An Organization for a Greater Eurasia? 

Some suggest the missing link is a coordinating structure in the region to facilitate, prioritize, and align development efforts. There have been a number of attempts at regional projects for the Eurasian continent that sought to play such a role. The Eurasian Economic Union, the Organization of Turkic States, the World Bank, the EU, and the many C5 formats have organizational interests and convening powers. While the SCO remains a Beijing-centric initiative, it has shown some ability to broaden its agenda to address the specific concerns and interests of Central Asian states. 

Established in 2001, the SCO emerged out of the “Shanghai Five,” a grouping of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan as they attempted to delineate and stabilize the post-Soviet borders of Central Asia. The organization has since doubled its membership to now include Belarus, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Counting full members and partner states, the SCO represents 40% of the world’s population and 30% of its GDP.  

Since its founding, the SCO has prioritized a security focus, tackling the threat of terrorism, separatism, and extremism while seeking to resolve non-traditional threats. Over time, member states have demonstrated an ability to shape the organization’s agenda to include a wider range of non-security issues. Notably, during the recent Tianjin Summit, Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev typified this trend by proposing to establish an “SCO Water Problems Study Center” in his country. He also emphasized that the organization could also become a global leader in trade, digital transformation, and sustainable development and not just a platform for regional stability. 

With a diverging agenda and a growing list of members and observers, it is unclear what role the SCO will eventually play in the region. Instances of discord between key members were evidenced in India’s initial rejection of issuing any joint statement this year. The growing diversity in the SCO’s makeup indicates China will not have complete influence over the direction of the organization. Absent evidence of concrete investments by the new development bank, Beijing might not reap more than public-relations benefits for its initiative.  

Going forward, Central Asian policymakers and international observers of the region already appear wary of Chinese promises of money. Although Beijing’s assurances paint a picture of a growing relationship between the region and China, they are not likely to dissuade other states from interacting and constructing closer ties as well.