Since September, kilometers-long lines of trucks have formed along the Kazakh-Russian border, as drivers wait to clear customs. Truckers and journalists have flooded social media with videos of the congestion, but there is no consensus on why these trucks are waiting. Russian media blame Kazakhstan's alleged sanction enforcement, while Kazakh officials point to Russia’s new migration laws and crackdowns on “grey imports.” Whatever the cause, it is clear that the existing framework of free trade between the two Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) members is under strain. This comes just days before Putin called to strengthen Russia’s trade with Central Asia at the Central-Asia Summit. 

Initially, Russia’s Federal Customs Service denied any slowdown, claiming the borders were open for business. By early October, however, Russian officials and state-aligned outlets began to detail the delays and Kazakhstan’s alleged role in it. Kommersant reported that 2,000 to 3,000 trucks carrying Chinese goods to Russia were waiting at the Mashtakov border crossing. The route, passing through Kazakhstan to Russia’s south-western border, is a major artery of trade between Russia and China.

According to Deputy Head of Logistics Maksim Yemelin from the Logistics Service Company, the delays stem from “increased controls on the transport of sanctioned and dual-use goods.” Such items— drones, semiconductors, engines, and other components— are central to Western sanctions aimed at constraining Russia’s defense industry after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has repeatedly affirmed his country’s commitment to compliance with Western sanctions while denying allegations that Kazakhstan has helped Russia evade sanctions. At the same time, capacity to enforce sanctions remains limited across Central Asia, especially in a region that relies heavily on trade with Russia. These sanctions inadvertently impact economies outside Russia with Kazakhstan-based companies like KBR Technologies LLP appearing on Western sanctions lists. As these effects permeate the region, Kyrgyzstan President Sadyr Japarov highlighted the collateral damage sanctions inflict on developing economies during the 2025 United Nations General Assembly. 

Russian sources warn that the current friction could foreshadow long-term shifts in regional trade routes. In his comments to Kommersant, Yemelin suggested that increasing compliance with Western sanctions represents a “new reality,” not just a “temporary setback.” After all, sanctions are expected to remain in place as Russia presses ahead in Ukraine and reorients its trade and energy markets toward non-Western partners. If contentious conditions in Kazakhstan continue, Moscow might look to reroute commerce through alternative eastern routes like the Manzhouli-Zabaikalsk crossing that bypasses Kazakhstan altogether. 

From Astana’s perspective, however, the issue appears temporary, as officials continue to deny any enforcement of Western sanctions. On October 3, Kazakhstan’s State Revenue Committee denied there were any unusual restrictions at the border and attributed any congestion to seasonal and logistical factors. The committee emphasized that Kazakhstan authorities have not conducted inspections in violation of EAEU free-trade commitments.

On October 7, Kazakhstan Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin addressed the issue in a meeting with Russian Ambassador Alexey Borodavkin. Both parties acknowledged the congestion and expressed willingness to work together to find a solution. On Telegram, Ambassador Borodavkin claimed the meeting addressed joint efforts to combat “grey” imports, goods that have been imported through unofficial or unauthorized channels. 

Two days later, Zhumangarin met with Kazakhstan officials, this time attributing the issue to new Russian migration laws. Russia’s crackdown on migration from visa-free countries reduced Kazakhstan drivers’ permitted stays from 180 to 90 days per year, constraining transport operations. He criticized the policy, noting that Kazakhstan grants foreign transport drivers, including Russians, extended stays to complete their work. On top of migration restrictions, the meeting concluded that Russia’s raids to combat grey imports are contributing to the buildup. 

Tightening restrictions on Russia’s border come as no surprise in light of its recent crackdown on labor migration, including a new registry naming those in violation of Russia’s increasingly high legal standard for migrants. Bolatbek Nazhmetdinuly, a member of Kazakhstan's ruling party, publicly opposed the policy on social media, posting messages from truck drivers who have been placed on Russia’s controlled-persons registry. Drivers on the list face the threat of arrest or deportation from Russia, transforming an otherwise routine job into a high-risk endeavor. 

Russia’s intensifying border controls are evident, yet Kazakhstan’s possible quiet compliance with sanctions cannot be ruled out. If reports of sanction enforcement are true, it would mark a major step in Kazakhstan's capacity to enforce the current sanctions. Such a move would also signal growing assertiveness in Kazakhstan’s effort to maintain strategic autonomy from Moscow. Sanctions could add an economic lever against Russian dominance, complementing more symbolic gestures like refusing to recognize the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics and speaking Kazakh during Putin’s 2023 visit to Astana. 

Whether the current border slowdown reflects deliberate sanction enforcement or collateral friction from Russia’s tightening domestic controls, it frames a broader reality: Russia’s influence on Kazakhstan is waning. If true, Kazakhstan’s sanctions enforcement would clearly indicate its intention to prioritize its own geopolitical interests rather than conform to Putin’s political agenda, forcing Russia to work within the constraints its neighbors define. At the same time, Russia’s restrictive migration policies are making it an increasingly unattractive trade partner and limiting the possibilities for economic cooperation between the two traditional partners. Together, these trends illustrate how Putin’s growing xenophobia and isolation from the West have only driven Russia further away from its so-called sphere of influence.