Recent months have arguably seen the most dramatic developments in Georgia’s international relations since the Russo-Georgian war in August of 2008.  In response to the governing Georgian Dream (GD) party’s passage of a controversial Russian-style foreign agents law in March, Georgia’s main partners since independence, the European Union and United States, have conducted a “comprehensive review” of relations and have put forward a series of moves severing much of the West’s high-level ties with Tbilisi.  With elections coming on October 26, the collapse of Georgian-Western relations appears to be the central motivating factor for a re-invigorated opposition, who view the election as existential for Georgia’s future. 

For years, Western-Georgian relations have been on thin ice.  Western leaders have expressed frustration about GD’s dovish stance toward Russia, with Tbilisi refusing to institute economic sanctions against Russia or provide Kyiv with military aid since February of 2022.  But the passage of the foreign agents law, despite mass street protests in opposition to it, appears to have pushed relations with the trans-Atlantic block to a breaking point.

Since GD passed the foreign agents law, Washington and Brussels have steadily rolled out a number of steps that, when taken together, demonstrate Georgia’s longstanding status as a Western ally is effectively gone.  In May, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs James O’Brien announced that the White House would release targeted visa bans against Georgian officials.  This was followed up by the European Union’s announcement that it would be ending its €30 million annual aid package to the Georgian military and the June decision placing Georgia’s long-running EU accession process on “de facto halt.”  A month later, the United States canceled its yearly joint military exercises with Georgia, citing “anti-Western” rhetoric from GD officials.  In late July, a bipartisan group of U.S. Representatives called for economic sanctions targeting high-ranking Georgian elites, and Secretary of State Anthony Blinken announced that the United States was ending its yearly $95 million financial aid package to the Georgian government. EU and U.S. statements make clear that they have not lost interest in Georgia, instead saying funds will be repurposed toward civil society.

Georgian Dream leaders have responded by doubling down on anti-Western rhetoric.  Since April, former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, widely thought to be the informal head of GD, has delivered two major speeches embracing a theory that the true reason for the falling out between the West and Georgia is a malicious global conspiracy he refers to as “the global war party.” This “global war party” supposedly wishes to force Georgia to open a second front of the Russo-Ukrainian war in Georgia and utilize the United National Movement (UNM), the largest opposition party, as a fifth-column.  Speaking in April, Ivanishvili stated that “Georgia and Ukraine were not allowed to join NATO and were left outside. All such decisions are made by the Global War Party, which has a decisive influence on NATO and the European Union, and which only sees Georgia and Ukraine as cannon fodder.”  Ivanishvili’s pitch to voters has relied on the idea that GD can protect Georgia from a confrontation with Russia, describing the election as a “referendum between war and peace.”  GD has also successfully mobilized social conservatism, passing a bill against “LGTB propaganda” this year.

The claim that Western elites are forcing Georgia to open a second front with Russia is a regularly repeated idea among Georgian Dream officials and has been categorically denied by U.S. and EU representatives. 

Georgia’s opposition appears to be recognizing the importance of the moment and is mobilizing after years of fractious dysfunction.  Opposition parties have stated that they view October's elections as a crucial opportunity to recover Georgia’s Western orientation and revive the possibility of eventual EU membership, seen by many as key to Georgia’s prosperity and geopolitical alignment. Georgian President and critic of GD, Salome Zourabichvili, has called October’s election a referendum on Georgia’s “European future.” The leader of the United National Movement, the largest opposition party, described the election as a chance to “to defeat the pro-Russian government … [and] to save Georgian democracy.” If the opposition is victorious this fall, ties with the West could recover. In his statement halting financial aid, Secretary Blinken noted that while Tbilisi’s current leadership is pushing Georgia away from democratic norms, the West “remain committed to the Georgian people and their Euro-Atlantic aspirations.”

Divisions remain, but opposition parties in Georgia are uniting in unprecedented ways.  In May, President Zourabichvili premiered the “Georgian Charter,” a pledge that, in the event of an opposition victory in October, all who signed would support a government made up of various opposition figures appointed by Zourabichilvi.  The charter, organized with the explicit purpose of recovering Georgia’s EU trajectory, was signed by 17 opposition figures, although it did not include all opposition parties currently in parliament.  The charter also promises to repeal the foreign agents law, and a series of other laws GD’s opponents view as damaging to Georgia's EU prospects.

Additionally, Georgia’s opposition parties have been active in forming alliances to avoid the prospect of small parties failing to cross the 5% vote-share threshold.  There are now four sizable opposition blocks: Unity, Coalition for Change, Strong Georgia, and For Georgia, the only group of the four that is not an alliance of smaller parties.  Recent polling indicates they might well be able to win a majority in the fall and that the election could be decided by a slim margin.  Smaller parties are still in talks to join larger groups, meaning that the electoral playing field is still taking shape. Speaking with OC-Media, a spokesperson for the small Citizens opposition party relayed, “We see a solution in unity and we think that enlargement is necessary for Georgia to continue its European integration and move smoothly towards Europe, and to defeat Georgian Dream through elections.”

For many onlookers, there is also serious concern around the degree to which October’s election will be fairly conducted and the votes counted.  A German Marshall Fund report found cause for worry, arguing that there is a risk for a “volatile and evolving crisis,” and that “the role of observers and media will be constrained, if not eliminated. Political violence and arrests are anticipated.... other shortcomings [have been] identified in the election framework and administration, the media and information space, and the political playing field.”  Recent months have seen a rise in intense anti-GD sentiment, as well as campaigns of intimidation and violence against opposition figures that bear the hallmarks of government coordination.  If a majority of Georgians do not believe that the elections are fair this fall, it could lead to the most extreme moment of crisis in Georgian politics since the 2003 Rose Revolution.

Georgia has seen two main pivotal moments in its 21^st-century political history.  The first was the aforementioned 2003 revolution that ushered in the governance of the United National Movement and Mikheil Saakashvili.  The second was the 2012 election that brought Georgian Dream and Bidzina Ivanishvili into power.  It now seems that Georgia is heading toward a moment of similar historic importance.  Whether Georgia emerges from this October under GD or under an opposition government will likely determine its international orientation and domestic situation for years to come.